Saul Kripke starts his work by expressly emphasizing the purpose of his argumentation. The paper is a "puzzle about names and beliefs." The first section of the paper deals with the philosophical background that will help put the puzzle in a proper framework. Kripke discusses Millianism and Fregeanism as two philosophical currents that attempt to understand semantics, the meaning of names and what names actually confer to an individual or a thing. Millianism supports the idea that a name has no other attribute than the fact that it helps identify an object. The name is nothing more than a referent: it does not give any attributes or a further understanding of the characteristics of the object. According to Millianism, the name is not a description, it is simply a tag. In this situation, names are substitutable in statements, including in beliefs. If S=B, then if A believes that'd can fly, automatically A also believes B. can fly.

Fregeanism proposes a different perspective on things. According to Fregeanism, words are not simple tags, they express some attributes that help identify the object. So, in the case of Millianism, the word per se was a referent. In the case of Fregeanism, it is much more than that: words are a way of presenting the object, of showing something about the object. As a consequence of this fact, names can no longer be substituted one with the other.

After the initial section debating the two primary notions and concepts, Kripke moves, in Section II, towards discussing more concrete principles that will be used in the puzzle. He introduces two important principles, the disquotational principle and the principle of translation. The disquotational principle stipulates that an individual accepts a sentence (namely the truth value of that sentence) if and only if the individual believes that sentence. The principle of translation basically stipulates that if a sentence is true in one language, then its translation into another language, any other language, is also true.

Before moving to the puzzle itself, it is worth to have a brief discussion about these two principles. Both of these are sound principles, although, when it comes to the principle of translation, one can wonder about the role of the translator and the quality of translation. Certainly, this is not the case of the puzzle that Kripke will present, but what happens, for example, if the translation is approximate, to the degree to which its value of truth is questionable.

The sentence was true in the initial language, but the bad translation made it only close to being true in the second language. Perhaps some of the nuances in English were lost when translating it to French. Some words may only have a complete meaning in English. Take the word "awe," for example. In English, awe means a lot more than any translation of this in French. Translations such as "tereur" (terror) or "admiration" (admiration) give only part of the meaning, so the translated version is only half true. One needs to know both languages perfectly to ensure that the translation has 100% the same meaning.

With the disquotational principle, Kripke is more thorough in adding the word "normal." "A normal English speaker who is not reticent will be disposed to sincere reflective assent to 'p' if and only if he believes that p." He adds in several other element that remove potential obstacles to making this an overarching statement: "who is not reticent" and "sincere." So, we are not looking at particular, limited situation in which the speaker is lying or somebody is coercing him to say something.

So now we move to the puzzle. Pierre is a normal French speaker who lives in France. Pierre speaks only French. He has heard that London is pretty, so he says, in French: "Londres est tres joli." Pierre thus believes that London is pretty. Pierre moves to London, in a part of the city that is not that pretty. He hears his neighbors say that London is not pretty, assents to that statement and believes. As a consequence, Pierre is left with the contradictory idea that London is both pretty and not pretty.

This is just a general, brief description of the puzzle. It is helpful to analyze its components and deconstruct it according to its different parts, also using the two principles that were previously mentioned in the process. So, for the beginning, Pierre has heard, in France and in French, that "Londres...

So, we could state, in French, that he indeed believes that.
Translating what was said in France results in the following English statement: Pierre believes that London is pretty. By the principle of translation, this is also a true sentence. Now Pierre is in London. He assents to the fact that "London is not pretty," which by the disquotational principle, means that he believes that "London is not pretty." So, Pierre believes that London is pretty and Pierre believes that London is not pretty, both at the same time, which is obviously contradictory.

Kripke proposes several potential solutions. The easiest one is to accept that Pierre can believe both that London is pretty and that London is not pretty. According to Kripke, however, this cannot occur, because Pierre is a rational individual and a rational individual cannot accept contradictory statements.

Another solution is to reject each of the principles. Rejecting the principle of translation does not appear a good solution, since the idea that what is true in one language is true if it is translated in another language is quite self-evident. However, the problem of the translation is discussed further below, but it is not the actual principle that seems at fault.

Rejecting the disquotational principle brings in a series of related complicated scenarios, potentially leading to the idea that the principle needs to be amended, to make it more dynamic. For example, perhaps Pierre can also change his mind, because being in London allowed him to witness first hand how things are there, rather than just hear it in France, from people he knew, who may or may not have been to London.

Finally, the last scenario is one where the translation of the sentence in French is rejected. This is something that I have briefly alluded to one pointing to potential problems with the principle of translation, notably the fact that you cannot be 100% sure of how true a translation is, unless you know very well both languages.

Looking strictly at the puzzle, before moving to a critical response to the article, I believe that the main probable with the scenario described is that it is too comprehensive. It deals only with wholes, without accepting that a whole is made up of its parts. So, indeed, one cannot say about something that it is only pretty. Some parts of London are pretty, and some parts of London are not pretty. There are not sufficient parts on either side to be able to generalize, especially when it comes to something as subjective as being pretty.

Another issue I have with Kripke's argumentation is that it is so one-sided and sophistic. This is something that I have noticed with other philosophers as well, the idea that if you frame the discussion in a certain way, you will reach the result you want. Kripke almost never the essential "what if" question that might lead him in a new direction of the analysis, because he knows where he wants to end up.

So, the first problem that I have with Kripke's article is that it is, indeed, possible for someone to believe, at the same time, something that appears contradictory. If one does not generalize, it is simple to assume that Pierre can believe that London is, at the same time, pretty and not pretty: some things make London pretty, others make London not pretty. London is both, even at the same time.

Another thing that Kripke does not seem to take into consideration is the realistic situation where Pierre thought that London was pretty because he had never actually been to London. It was all hear-say. At the moment t, when he is in France, he truly believes that London is pretty. However, he is now at moment t+1, when he is actually in London. Things change, opinions change, his opinion changed. He now believes that London is not pretty, which does not mean that he did not believe, at a time, that London was also pretty. Again, things are dynamic and Kripke should also consider this in his argumentation.

I also don't agree with Kripke's statement that this is a puzzle about beliefs. It is not, in my opinion, a puzzle about beliefs, it is a puzzle about belief assumptions. We assume, through a logical deduction process, that Pierre believes this and that Peter believes…