¶ … September 11, a whole new range of advanced security equipment and protocols has been put in place. However, many of these systems and procedures remain inconsistent from airport to airport. One of the most critical ways of promoting faster passenger throughput without sacrificing the main goals of security is consistency and standardization among American airports, with an ultimate goal of working more tightly with global partners to create a consistent international travel security experience. If passengers know what to expect at each airport, the screening procedures can become more streamlined. Even if shifts in global threat alerts do often change the details in the procedures, passenger throughput does not need to be adversely affected if the overall protocols and goals remain the same. It may also be important to ensure that employees receive ample time and training in using any new equipment that is introduced, and that all equipment glitches be ironed out prior to going live with the new devices. A report from the Dallas Fort Worth International Airport (2005) reveals that even the simplest of changes to the security screening process can enhance passenger through-put without sacrificing any of the core elements of safety and screening procedures. The most important aspects of the Dallas Fort Worth case study include the improved signage prior to the x-ray machines, which prevented bottlenecks due to unprepared passengers who had not yet divested themselves of the necessary items prior to the screenings. A second aspect of the Dallas Fort Worth case study was the extension of the zone after the x-ray machine, during which the shoeless passengers attempt to gather their belongings and repack their bags. These changes require some investment into equipment like longer rollers, additional tables and seating in the post-screening areas, and additional signs. However, the results revealed a 33% increase in throughput, reducing individual passenger wait times by 43% too (Dallas/Forth Worth International Airport, 2005). In fact, the airport did not sacrifice any security measures but rather, improved the efficiency of its airport while empowering the passenger to be more alert and informed about what was expected of them during the procedure. This potentially reduces any antagonism or confusion that could result from uninformed or ignorant passengers.

More sophisticated methods of enhancing passenger throughput times without altering the effectiveness of security procedures include the use of robust algorithms for the queuing process itself. The processes suggested by Lee & Jacobson (2009) would be especially helpful at major international airports using both steady state and transient methods, leading to optimal static and dynamic assignment policies that can reduce the amount of time a passenger spends in the system. Lee & Jacobson (2009) present a formula that not only increases passenger throughput but also increases the number of positive alarms, thereby maximizing overall efficiency of the system. The process serves the two core objectives of maximizing both security and passenger throughput. Another method of improving passenger throughput and maximizing security performance, related to the robust algorithm process of differentiating queues, is thee effective segregation of passengers according to their status as low risk, "ordinary," and high risk (Poole & Carafano, 2006). Federal travel registration systems like the Trusted Traveler Program help to identify low risk passengers who can receive a more streamlined and facilitated security screening process, versus a more intense one for ordinary passengers on whom little is actually known, and the smaller set of high risk individuals "about whom so little is known that the safest thing to do is to assume the worst and thoroughly screen both their persons and their checked and carry-on bags," (Poole & Carafano, 2006). The problem with this approach is that passengers labeled as "low risk" could someday become security risks, such as through the process of radicalization. If, as Poole & Carafano (2006) suggest, "first-class and elite frequent flyers" receive preferential treatment in security queues, security may be sacrificed in the needs of improving passenger throughput. Both security and throughput concerns are equally as important. Profiling methods recommended by Poole & Carafano (2006) also cause concern for civil rights, as ethnographic data is likely to be a factor in passenger screening. Rather than improving passenger throughput, invasive methods like the ones Poole & Carafano (2006) suggest could cause even more time loss due to passenger arguments, negotiations, and diversion of staff attention from the bulk of the passengers flowing through the system.

Since September 11, security screening procedures and regulations continue to change in order to reflect prevailing risks. However, the process of security screening at airports continues to be described as "inconsistent, stressful, and invasive," (IASA, 2012, p. 5). The need for more effective security systems that meet the dual purpose of increasing throughput and security at the same time...

Enhancing passenger throughout can in fact be viewed as a component of improving passenger and airport safety, because effective throughout prevents the diversion of resources toward actual threats.
References

Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport (2005). Security checkpoints. Retrieved online: https://www.dfwairport.com/cs/groups/public/documents/webasset/p1_008154.pdf

IATA (2012). Security access and egress. Retrieved online: https://www.iata.org/whatwedo/stb/Documents/pf-guide-security-2012.pdf

Lee, A.J. & Jacobson, S.H. (2009). The impact of aviation checkpoint queues on security screening effectiveness. Retrieved online: http://www.agifors.org/award/submissions2009/AdrianLee_paper.pdf

Poole, R.W. & Carafano, J. (2006). Time to rethink airport security. Retrieved online: http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2006/07/time-to-rethink-airport-security

2. Since September 11, processes and procedures for cargo screening have become more robust than ever. A full 100% of container cargo and personal vehicles at land borders is screened, as is 99% of shipping containers (United States Department of Homeland Security, 2015). The United States is also partnering with Canada and Mexico for mutually supportive security agreements related to cargo screening. Likewise, international security partnerships ensure consistency in screening of passenger cargo and commercial goods. Yet there is always room to increase the effectiveness of air cargo screening.

Current air cargo screening standards focus more on the percentages of parcels and bags being screened than to the quality of the screening process itself, and the need to more heavily scrutinize any cargo flagged as being a risk factor, such as unattended baggage or equipment. The Department of Homeland Security's commitment to increasing the quantity of cargo screened to a full 100% does not necessarily include a program dedicated to improving the quality of cargo screening efforts even thought the quality of, and technologies used in, air cargo screening is as important as the quantity. There are also issues related to air cargo security personnel screening, and overall regulations and standards with unattended baggage. It would not, as McNeil (2010) recommends, be safer to pass on the burden of security checks to private courier companies because doing so seriously threatens the integrity of the screening system and creates security breaches and loopholes that can be avoided by a tighter, standardized system.

Two ways of increasing the effectiveness of air cargo security would include one information and intelligence-based approach, which also focused on improved screening of shippers and all cargo employees. Another method of increasing the effectiveness of air cargo security would be equipment-oriented, as the TSA's (2006) suggestion to mandate blast-proof shipping containers placed in the cargo holds on passenger flights or all air cargo flights would also help to minimize security risks without increasing the amount of technology training needed for air cargo employees. More robust screening technologies and x-rays might also improve the cost-effectiveness and reliability of the cargo security.

Intelligence-based approaches naturally preserve the integrity of the entire chain of security, from the hiring of security screening personnel to the discernment of higher risk cargo that may need to undergo more scrutiny. Shipping companies can shoulder some of the burden for screening what they send to the airline service and airports. Likewise, TSA could maintain more direct oversight into the background checks for employees at cargo and shipping companies. The "known shipper" protocols already used by the TSA could become enhanced by standardized procedures that have not been fully implemented yet (Elias, 2007). As of 2006, the TSA recommended consolidation of the exorbitant 4000 "known shipper" lists into a centralized database. Centralizing the database would ensure that consistent rules, standards and procedures for monitoring would be maintained over time. Likewise, background checks for off-airport freight forwarders could minimize problems associated with security risks. Another way intelligence-based approaches would improve the efficiency and effectiveness of cargo security would be more intelligence sharing among partner nations and as wide a network of airports as possible (McNeil, 2010). Intelligence should identify airports that have known issues, related to improper staff screening, past problems with security breeches, or known points of smuggling.

Cargo screening still does remain a core concern for national security. As of the provisions of the 9/11 Act, 100% of cargo on passenger aircraft is screened, and 100% of "high risk cargo" incoming from international sources is screened. However, there are no established standards for how to identify high-risk cargo other than to pair passenger data with checked baggage. The TSA (2006) recommends the increase in canine forces but the increase does not entail mandating that canines be used, and nor would it be feasible to…