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This point is made time in again among the accounts of the battle, where historians laud General Lee's relentless fighting spirit even in the face of growing losses of precious men and materiel. For example, despite his enormous losses, General Lee continued to prosecute the battle in an opportunistic fashion throughout the daylong battle in hopes of ultimately turning the tide. In this regard, Jamieson advises that, "Even [after sustaining devastating losses], Lee conceded the initiative grudgingly and during the day-long battle he made division-sized counterattacks, exhausted all of his reserves, and looked for opportunities to seize the offensive."
After 12 hours, it would seem reasonable to suggest that both sides would have had enough and would have been exhausted to the point where they could fight no longer, but General Lee never really gave up the offensive. For instance, Jamieson adds that, "While the Federals were driving in his center along the Sunken Road, the Southern commander considered an attack against McClellan's right. The battle in fact ended with a Confederate offensive, a.P. Hill's timely thrust into the left flank of the Ninth Corps."
In response to McClellan's refusal to pursue the Confederates into their own territory and perhaps end the war three years sooner was regarded as treasonous by some U.S. congressmen. For example, Michigan's Senator Zachariah Chandler, considered McClellan "an imbecile if not a traitor," and if a "traitor he ought to be shot."
Although it is important to qualify that this statement about treasonous behavior and suggesting his execution was made in a letter to the senator's wife, there were some clear indications among lawmakers that if McClelland was not colluding outright with the South, he otherwise lacked the skills or wherewithal need to win the war in general and the Battle of Antietam in particular. For instance, McPherson reports that, "These statements, like McClellan's about Stanton, were made in letters to their wives. But publicly Chandler -- and others -- challenged the claim that the Army of the Potomac was outnumbered. In this they were right. McClellan's problem was not lack of reinforcements, they charged, but lack of the will to fight. 'We feel much obliged to you for your exposure of that windbag and humbug McClellan,' wrote one of Chandler's correspondents."
Likewise, Armstrong (2008) points out that, "McClellan, as the principal Federal commander from the summer of 1861 until November 1862, is easily one of the most controversial figures of the war. His performance as commander of the Army of the Potomac during the Maryland Campaign is usually characterized as excessively slow, overly cautious, and blind to the opportunity presented him for defeating the Army of Northern Virginia and ending the war at the Battle of Antietam."
One of the consistent themes that emerges from the relevant literature is just how well General Lee did at Antietam despite the overwhelming Northern forces that were arrayed against him. For instance, in an evaluation of the criticism directed at McClellan's half-hearted advances and demonstrated failure to deploy the superior manpower that was available to him at the Battle of Antietam, Duncan (1999) notes that in reality, many were not a match for the Confederate troops. For instance, Duncan emphasizes that, "Nearly one-quarter of McClellan's infantry consisted of green troops as opposed to Lee's veterans, whereas they constituted one-half of the Harpers Ferry garrison."
Likewise, Duncan cites the vital roles played by J.E.B. Stuart and John Pelham in the manner in which artillery pieces were handled on Nicodemus Heights and Hauser's Ridge and concludes that notwithstanding better performances in a number of other battles, the "success [of southern batteries] was especially tangible at Antietam."
Other historians have also emphasized that superior generalship of Robert E. Lee during the Battle of Antietam as contributing to the hard-fought outcome. For example, Cannan (1994) reports that, "In supervising the battle, Lee and his lieutenants once again demonstrated their outstanding brilliance, shifting troops where needed to blunt the thrusts of his adversary."
The relentlessness of the Confederate leadership provided by General Lee even in the face of overwhelming odds is also made evident by Cannan's observation that, "In the cases where they did not have organized reinforcements available, lines were improvised and thrown into the fray. Though hard pressed throughout the battle, the generals and men had refused to quit and retreat. However, they had reached the limits of their endurance and without reinforcements they could do no more...
Still, Burnside did not make use of his possibilities and therefore assumed the Confederate Army's position. Taking into account the limited visibility, the fog and the conditions in the area, mistakes were inevitable. Therefore, his decision not to take full advantage of his available resources also proved important for the outcome of the battle. Finally, another major element that contributed to the failure of the Fredericksburg campaign was the confusion
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174). McPherson also points out that following the Union victory at Laurel Hill, McClellan was given the responsibility of training the newly-named Army of the Potomac at Washington, D.C. Upon arriving in the city, McClellan "found no army to command, only a mere collection of regiments, perfectly raw and dispirited... " He then "took hold with a firm hand to reorganize and train these troops" which demonstrates his excellent skills
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