If [these] postulates are correct, there very well could be an economic incentive for public authorities (i.e. states) to create post-tenure review and other methods to avoid such employment rights." (Dilts et al., 335) This is a new insight on the subject, producing a clearer understanding of the political battle being waged between educators and those administrative and governmental forces that have sought a change in employment policies. And in some regard, teachers face a great deal of opposition not just from educational leadership but from the general public. This returns us to the insight that there is something resembling resentment on the part of other professionals that teachers are afforded this security and, to the perception of some, a freedom from critical oversight. The emergence of post-tenure policies is based on the reality that tenure would function to protect many such teachers whose protected status had allowed for a decline in performance, motivation...

According to Chait (2005) "a public perception 'that tenure protects "deadwood" is prevalent and 'alas, correct,' confessed Stanford's former president. As a result, customers and taxpayers feel shortchanged, a concern exacerbated by the end to the mandatory retirement in 1994." (Chait, 11)
Therefore, we can begin to understand how the public gradually instigated the adoption of post-tenure review policies. These insights help us to resolve that though there is a need for continued training, development and motivation of tenured teachers, tying punitive conditions pending review to one's tenure is both inappropriate and indicative of impure motives.

Works Cited:

Chait, R.P. (2005). The Questions of Tenure. Harvard University Press.

Dilts, D.A.; Samavati, H. & Rahnama-Moghadam, M. (2007). Economic Motivation for Post-Tenure Review in Academic Institutions. Journal of Collective Negotiations, 31(4), 333-341.