Haiti Case Study and Response to Disaster
The 2010 earthquake was one of the most powerful earthquakes to hit Haiti in a century. This mega-disaster killed thousands of people and displaced more. The catastrophe triggered massive relief efforts that serve vital disaster management lessons for world regions. This paper draws largely on a 2010 report by the United States Joint Forces Command. The essay reviews the Joint Task Force Haiti Case Study and annotates the joint logistical planning processes and the joint mission execution designed for the Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Relief mission. Specific topics to be covered and analyzed include USSOUTHCOM's organization, Situational Awareness, deployment of forces, the speed of response versus force/resource flow requirements and communication.
Organization
The U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) adopted a directorate organization model to promote collaboration within stakeholders as well as interagency (United States Joint Forces Command, 2010). This structure gave the combatant commanders the latitude and authority to establish the staff organization that they perceive crucial in carrying out assigned duties, missions, and responsibilities. Once the SOUTHCOM identified its missions, functions, and tasks, it then developed a Functions and Organization manual that documented the organizational model and served as the ground for deciding work force required to achieve the missions. SOUTHCOM's organization concentrated on tackling their daily mission requirements that entailed overcoming challenges which hamper the stability and security in the area. However, to support inter-agency solutions, the command created an organizational structure that transitioned them from the traditional joint staff structure to a staff structure. Three functional directorates and three mission directorates characterized the new organizational model (United States Joint Forces Command, 2010).
Situational Awareness
SOUTHCOM was forced to fight to obtain situational awareness. Immediately after the disaster, the information coming from Haiti was not sufficient to inform decision-making. Essentially, all movements were stopped because of the rubble; communication systems went down and most entities, which typically serve as sources of input, for instance, Government of Haiti, NGOs, and the UN, all were devastated in equal measure by the earthquake as the general populace. Even prior to the disaster, these agencies still lacked robust assessment capabilities. Therefore, with scanty reporting generated by normal channels, SOUTHCOM's decision-makers resorted to
Often, the media used satellite feeds and real-time video to stay ahead of the military in explaining the on-the-ground scenario. Besides, news reports were a key driver for a deluge of inquiry in the initial phases. In response to the ensuing demand for in-depth tactical information from top decision-makers imposed great demands on the Command's energy and time and often disrupted the planning procedure. Initially, most of the leadership staff spent an estimated 8 hours per day either preparing or executing video teleconferences with other leaders in distant locations. Often, during these teleconferences, the leaders in Haiti were asked questions to which they lacked any immediate response and means to find answers.
Speed of response versus force/resource flow requirements
The rescue process for the Haiti took the efforts of 140 nations, 100 non-governmental organizations, private organizations, and charity. A sequence of activities from different stakeholders took place including authorizations of U.S. military humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), and the formation of Joint Task Force Haiti (JTF-H). It was crucial for the U.S. to open the airport because the initial over-the-show supplies had been hampered with. They started with 35 flights daily but then advanced to 200 flights daily (United States Joint Forces Command, 2010). From the angle of humanitarian aid, logistics is one of the best things that any military staff can do in such a situation, and the U.S. did incredibly well. Initially, SOUTHCOM deployed a push method in deploying forces (United States Joint Forces Command, 2010). Since speed was a key factor and the obvious need to respond to a crisis of such a scale great, they decided to adopt a strategy of mass in numbers to overcome ambiguity. Initially, force flow was based solely on verbal orders that led to the uncoordinated sequencing of equipment and units that continued throughout the first few weeks. The commanders failed to communicate well among themselves regarding what forces would be shifted to the Joint Operational Area (JOA) through verbal orders. Nevertheless, the…
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