Folkman, MI. California Engineer Sees Fears About New Orleans Levee system Come True, 2005
The author writes about the thoughts and experiences of Robert Bea, civil engineer at the University of California in Berkeley on the recent killer hurricane in New Orleans. Bea studied the city's levee system since 1954 when began working for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, He discovered that it was not high enough and that parts of the city were far below sea level. Fixing the levee system permanently could be a multi-year and multi-dollar effort. The Corps of Engineer reported that major breaches of the levees at the 17th Street and London Canals had been sealed and that water was being pumped out of the city. It, however, said that the entire system was designed to contain only up to Category 3 of a fast-moving hurricane. When Katrina reached land, it was a strong Category 4 disaster and the conditions exceeded the design of the levees system.
Behar, M. Hurricanes, 2005
The author writes that the Saffir-Simpson hurricane scale defines a Category 5 storm as one with "winds greater than 155 miles per hour" and with a surge greater than 18 feet. It was assumed that one such storm was likely to occur only once in every 500 to 1,000 years, and if one did, its surge would swell, overtop the levees and put the city under water up to 40 feet. When it would occur, the levees would serve only as a bathtub, the author quotes chief coastal engineer Harley Winer of the Army Corps at the New Orleans District. Winer then thought that the water getting trapped between the Mississippi levees and the hurricane-protection levees as highly improbable, though possible.
Method
This paper used the descriptive-normative research method in recording, describing, interpreting and analyzing information from various authoritative sources, such as books, reports, news and journal articles and professional accounts.
Findings
Damaging winds are the primary concern with any hurricane, but the people of New Orleans know that their biggest threat is water (Galle 2005). They actually live in a bowl or underwater, according to Director Frank Hijuelos of the New Orleans Office of Emergency Preparedness. The city is 6 feet below sea level. A complex series of levees built between the city and the Gulf (Folkman 2005). South of the city is the Mississippi River and Lake Pontchartrain in the North. The Gulf is 100 miles to New Orleans and covers 630 square miles yet is only 25 feet deep. This shallowness is precisely the greatest threat to the city during a hurricane. The formal levee system was established in 1890 along with the Orleans Levee District. To begin with, levees are not permanent structures and not as strong as earthen dams. They are also not engineered to sustain flood pressure beyond a few days. Most other levees in the U.S. were also fortified after the Mississippi River flood in 1927. But those along the northern edge warding off the waves of Lake Pontchartrain were unlike other levees, which were built by the federal Army Corps of Engineers according to high standards and made quite strong. In comparison, those built around the Lake were privately or locally built without the same or similar degree of engineering. Only 17 of the 79 levees that were breached by the Mississippi River flood were federally constructed. The federal government also said that it was unlikely for floodwaters to overtop these levees because they usually seep underneath the river and then appear on the land slide. Severe pressure sometimes leads to "sand boils," the soil within the levee liquefies and structural failure occurs. It, however, admitted that improvements on these levees were done only on piece meal basis because these were expensive. Instead, designs were made to reinforce and prevent the backflow of water into the city during heavy storms (Folkman 2005, Handwerk 2005). It has been reported, though, that reinforcements were built in only one of the three major drainage canals.
There have been lessons to learn from. The levee system already proved ineffective in warding off waves from Lake Pontchartrain as can be gleaned from the consequences of Hurricane Georges in 1998 and Hurricane Betsy in 1965 (Folkman 2005, Handwerk 2005). The natural location, the insufficient height of the levees, their design and the discontinuation of funding are significant issues to address, not only on account of the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, but also in view of succeeding...
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