Negotiations-Arusha Peace Process in Rwanda

Negotiations-Arusha Peace Process in Rwanda

Analyze the success/failure of negotiations to resolve the dispute.

Two warring factions in Rwanda signed Arusha accord on August 3, 1993: Government of Rwanda (GoR) and Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). These accords are reflections of an extraordinary testament that even most well crafted negotiations cannot be considered an accomplishment until critical implementation. This research article focuses on the examination of specific factors of the Arusha negotiations that led to the implementation failure. The first component for evaluation is the examination of the institutional barriers of the negotiations. This relates to the two-level game structure, which weakened the bargaining strength of Government of Rwanda in comparison to the united and well-organized RPF. This led to the perspective by members of the government team on the entire peace process as disadvantageous or win-lose situation.

Despite this suspicion, both bargaining teams had sufficient trust on the role of the third party handling the negotiations thus the essence of signing the accords ultimately (Klepp p.385). The second aspect of this research exercise will focus on the failure of the third parties in relation to sustaining trust and positive spirit in the implementation of the accords. This action led to the development of the institutional and strategic barriers thus prevention of the implementation of the agreed-upon protocols of the accords thus the adoption of the distributive bargaining terms during the implementation phase. By considering themselves as he losers in the negotiations, the Government of Rwanda became most susceptible in relation to the recruitment by the spoiler groups thus abandoning commitment to the concept to peace during the implementation phase. In order to ensure that the negotiations as a victor's deal for the RPF, certain measures should have been undertaken by the third parties during the implementation phase.

The main aim of this strategy is to counter the effects of the institutional barriers and strategic challenges directly. This is essential for the adoption of an integrative approach rather than distributive strategy with the aim of maximizing numerous win-win situations that existed during the implementation phase.

It is essential to focus on the background information on the Rwanda's history with the aim of understanding the dynamics of the negotiation process. The population of the nation is approximately seven million with two major groups (Hutu-85% and Tutsi (15% of the citizenry). Prior to the colonial era, people of Rwanda lived happily and harmoniously. The terms such 'Hutu and Tutsi' were constructed politically and socially as opposed to ethnic conceptions as a reflection of harmonious and peaceful living. "Hutu and Tutsi" were designed to refer to cultivators and cattle owners respectively.

Cattle were critical assets in the case of Rwanda thus the adoption of the thought of elite by the Tutsi. Despite the essence of harmonious living, Rwanda did not survive the aspect of colonial differentiation under the influence of ethnicity. Acquisition of Rwanda in 1885 led to the implementation of racial hierarchy such as the concept of Hamitic hypothesis. Ethnicity developed into a critical force with Tutsi considered as the leaders while Hutu acted as their servants. The end of the First World War so the conditions worsen in the case of Rwanda as acquisition of the nation by Belgium led to rapid development of ethnic differentiation. There was a critical development of resentment in relation to this repression among the Hutu population until the case of violent uprising in 1959. The eventual outcome of the war was loss of lives of about 20,000 Tutsis plus massive exit by the same population in the case of Rwanda. This was the end of the dominance by Tutsi thus enabling power-hungry Hutu population to fill the positions vacated by the colonial power (Belgians).

The scars of the political rule were prominent in the next few decades as the main focus of the power-hungry Hutu as on the retention of power rather than addressing the damage done by colonizers thus increase in the societal division. The strained ethnic environment reached its climax following the invasion of Rwanda by RPF stationed in Rwanda. The main components of the rebel army were exiled Tutsi. The invasion consisted of critical demands such as elimination of discrimination against the Tutsis, inclusion of Tutsis in the government, and provision of the right for the thousands of the exiled Tutsis to return home. This invasion had two critical influences: initiation of the three-year civil war and the development of negotiations or regional mediation with the main objective of reconciling warring parties.

This background evaluation of the case of Rwanda reflects on the political tension and ethnicity by 1990s. Tanzania was the third party in enhancing the development and implementation of the Arusha accords. According to the information provided by the third party, the case of Rwanda was extremely tenacious. This is because of involvement of fundamental concepts in relation to human life. Such concepts included safety, land, recognition, identity, security, and esteem thus reflection of challenges to the development of human beings. The main context of Arusha accords was hostile environment thus one of the factors that led to the failure of the implementation phase. The first aspect of the peace process in Rwanda was development of terms and conditions of the Arusha accords in France by the warring factions. The first approach by Tanzania in overseeing the peace process was the implementation of the incremental approach thus starting with least contentious issues thus abandoning the summit strategy in favour of the inclusive approach. This approach was fruitful within the shortest time possible following a recommendation to the Organization of African Unity in order to supply neutral military components with the aim of overseeing implementation of peace process. The neutral army by the OAU was also essential in managing hostilities in the case of Rwanda during the implementation process (Rothchild p.8). In the first phase of the implementation of the peace process in Rwanda, there was the development of another third party in the negotiation process known as the Joint Political Military Commission. This third party offered an opportunity for the warring parties to meet, complain, and talk on tricky issues in an informal atmosphere.

In relation to the rapid positive developments in the case of the peace process, there was an essential consensus with reference to the rule of law (Arusha III). This second in 1992 was essential in settling issues with reference to Broad-Based Transitional Government thus overseeing the reduction of the powers of the president to merely ceremonial ones. This resulted into severe concession by the Government of Rwanda in the subsequent negotiations of Arusha IV, V, and VI. For instance, in the fifth phase of the Arusha accords, RPF demanded on the exclusion of the right wing faction of the government from both negotiations and future governments. The argument by the RFP led to weakening of the president's powers and reduction in numbers or voting power by the government in relation to this peace process (Dolgopol p.260). In 1993, there was jubilation and celebrations following the signing of the final agreement between President Habyarimana and Colonel Alexis Kanyarqenge (leader of RPF).

Most of the observers argued that the peace process in the context of Rwanda was the most successful encounter in the history of African conflicts thus becoming a textbook-mediation. All the third parties were present during this encounter. It is still arguable on the exclusion of the right arm of the government in the negotiation process. Various efforts were applicable in addressing causes of the conflict under the management of a neutral mediator or third party. It is essential to note on the essence of agreement on factors that had plagued Rwanda for decades. Such factors include principles of law, repatriation of refugees, power-sharing, and integration of military in the context of Rwanda. Despite of these developments, it is vital to note that the process was flawed thus proving decisive during the implementation phase.

Institutional barriers in relation to the internal structures of the Government of Rwanda were the main causes of failure of the implementation process in relation to the case of Rwanda. This was critical challenge to the conclusion of the peace process or Arusha accords in the case of Rwanda. Some of the concepts that led to the complication of the negotiation processes include internal, political, and organizational dynamics within relevant institutions. Despite the fact institutional barriers had minimal influence in the signing of the agreement by the Government of Rwanda; they had an influential role in the failure of the implementation phase. The barriers were essential in the reduction of the powers of the government to the extent that the team was unable to achieve any significant gains in relation to the negotiations or peace process in Rwanda. This led to dissatisfaction by extremists and moderates during the implementation process (Schlotterer p.2500).

It is essential to note that internal politics are essential in the bargaining success. In the case of the Government of Rwanda, it was impossible to achieve essential union because of the inclusion of three aspects reporting to unique or different centres of power. Inclusion of polarized differences within the so-called team in relation to the government of Rwanda was vital for the lack of agreement during the negotiations. Two-level game situation and chaotic structures led to the failure of the bargaining power of the government of Rwanda during the negotiation process. One of the eventual outcomes of the negotiation process was the composition of the national army with 50% from the Tutsis population. This led to inabilities and sense of inferiority in the case of Rwanda. It is also essential to note the difference between the fractured and ineffective Government of Rwanda in comparison to the strongly and united RPF during the negotiation process. This unity of the RPF was under the influence of the military superiority following the break-out of the civil war and essence of exile in the case of Uganda.

The concept of war in Uganda was essential in the efforts of the Tutsis military for the purposes of restoration of political and social reforms in the case of Rwanda. During the negotiation process, it is essential to fight for more years and appear less eager for the settlement thus an opportunity to realize success in the phase of implementation. This is reflected in the approach adopted by the RPF during the negotiation process. This is evident in the implementation of alternative approach in the case of RPF through fighting rather than bargain in the context of the peace or negotiation processes. RPF gained confidence in damaging the government though insurgency during the negotiation processes. This follows abandoning of the negotiation table by the RPF to implement offensive approach. The eventual outcome of application of force as an option to bargaining was displacing thousands of citizens within 20 miles from the capital city of Kigali. This application of force was facilitated by negative influence of the course on the Government of Rwanda in relation to economic implications (McClintock p.80). The civil war was essential in causing harm to the economy of Rwanda thus inability of the government to participate effectively and efficiently during the negotiation process. Institutional barriers were essential in fuelling failure of the implementation phase.