Narcoterrorism and the Future

¶ … Mexico faces an array of drug-related problems ranging from production and transshipment of illicit drugs to corruption, violence, and increased internal drug abuse. Powerful and well-organized Mexican organizations control drug production and trafficking in and through Mexico, as well as the laundering of drug proceeds. These organizations also have made a concerted effort to corrupt and intimidate Mexican law enforcement and public officials. In addition, the geographic proximity of Mexico to the United States and the voluminous cross-border traffic between the countries provide ample opportunities for drug smugglers to deliver their illicit products to U.S. markets. The purpose of this study was to develop informed and timely answers to the following research questions: (a) How serious is the trade in illicit drugs between Mexico and the United States today and what have been recent trends? (b) How does drug trafficking fund terrorist organizations in general and trade between Mexico and the U.S. In particular? (c)

What interdictions have proven most effective in stemming the flow of drugs into the United States from Mexico? And (d) What further steps need to be implemented to reverse the tide of drugs and violence that continues to threaten Mexican-U.S. security relations? These answers are presented in the study's conclusion together with recommendations for law enforcement authorities in both countries.

Table of Contents

Introduction

Purpose and Need

Project Beginning

Theoretical Framework

Goal and Objectives

Literature Review

Critical Assets Identification

Threat Assessment

Vulnerability Assessment

Risk Analysis

Conclusion

Introduction

Purpose and Need

In the United States, Pennsylvania and Delaware are home to over 13 million people; the cities of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Wilmington, Delaware, are part of the sixth largest Metropolitan Statistical Area in the country. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania comprises the 22nd largest Metropolitan Statistical Area. This paper will address an analysis of heroin availability, purity, pricing, and abuse trends for Pennsylvania and Delaware. At the conclusion of this document the source country that supplies most of the heroin, cocaine and often prescription medication into the United States will be identified as Mexico.

Heroin poses a formidable threat throughout Pennsylvania and Delaware, as evidenced by the increasing availability of high purity, low priced heroin and the resulting escalation in abuse, drug treatment admissions, and overdose deaths. This threat is exacerbated by the widely-reported trend of prescription drugs abusers migrating to heroin, seeking a cheaper and more available high. The DEA Philadelphia Division routinely assesses and ranks the drug threats to Philadelphia and the Delaware area as determined by availability, threat to public health, community impact, attendant crime, enforcement activity, seizures, drug abuse and treatment statistics, as well as propensity for abuse. Analysis of these factors, supplemented by investigative reporting, human intelligence, liaison, and open source data, allows for a comprehensive overview of each drug area, culminating in the ranking of drug threats throughout the Philadelphia and Delaware area. Based on the aforementioned analysis, for each the past five years, heroin has ranked as the primary drug threat to the Philadelphia area and the State of Delaware. In addition, in each reporting area (Allentown, Harrisburg, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and Scranton, Pennsylvania, as well as Wilmington, Delaware), heroin has ranked as either the primary or secondary drug threat in each of the last five years.

Along with Canada, the U.S.-Mexico bilateral relationship is one of the most important for the United States today (Montesclaros, 2011). The U.S.-Mexican relationship, though, is characterized by a number of ongoing serious problems, including how to best manage the relationship in view of the deteriorating security in border regions and even into the interior of Mexico, as well as how to conceptualize the salient issues from a security perspective that takes into account the legitimate views of both Mexico and the United States (Montesclaros, 2011). According to Montesclaros, although bilateral trade and immigration remain among the most important issues facing both countries, there are also three security threats that have assuming higher priority in recent years: (1) organized crime (this category also includes narcotics trafficking and arms smuggling); (2) illegal migration and trafficking in persons; and (3) terrorism (Montesclaros, 2011). Many authorities agree that there is an inextricable interrelationship between the former and latter categories as well (Trafficking and transnational crime, 2010).

Although these problems have been recognized for some time by law enforcement authorities in both countries, there have been some changes in the situation in recent years that have made the Mexican-U.S. border conditions worse than ever, with escalating levels of violence that Mexican law enforcement authorities have been unwilling or unable to address. In this regard, Montesclaros (2011) emphasizes that, "What is new in this mix are the unprecedented levels of violence and audacity displayed by criminal organizations, particularly the drug trafficking organizations, which are increasingly emboldened-committing more acts in public, targeting Mexican police forces without hesitation, and even hiring ex-special forces members from the Mexican military" (p. 98). These recent violent trends in the narcotrafficking industry along the Mexican border have been well publicized in the international media in general and the United States press in particular, causing growing public condemnation and demands for resolution of these increasingly serious issues by the governments of both the United States and Mexico (Montesclaros, 2011).

Indeed, drug-related violence has already claimed the lies of more than 43,000 Mexicans, the majority of them civilians, just since December 2006 when Mexican President Felipe Calderon launched a military initiative designed to counter the growing power of the drug cartels (Carpenter, 2012). Government authorities in the United States, though, remain concerned about the possibility of the growing violence destabilizing the Mexican state as well as the potential for the violence to cross the border into America (Carpenter, 2012). Indeed, the editors of Americas Quarterly (2010) emphasize that, "Narcotics trafficking and the transnational criminal organizations that sponsor it represent the gravest and most complex threat to democracy and human rights that our region faces today" (Trafficking and transnational crime, p. 38).

In response to these growing threats, some analysts have formulated three broad policy options that should be applied to the Mexico-U.S. drug trade problem: (a) increased engagement with Mexico, (b) maintaining current levels of aid and support, and (c) retrenchment from the status quo (Montesclaros, 2011). According to Monteclaros, "Recent dialogue has centered on variations of the first two options, while there is little talk of pulling back. In fact, most observers say "more, faster, wider, and deeper" with regard to the amount, speed of application, and breadth and depth of U.S. aid to Mexico" (2011, p. 98). These are vitally important issues because the suffering that has taken place as a result of the drug war in Mexico has been appalling (Buxton, 2012). Indeed, some estimates indicate that more than 60,000 people have been killed in violent exchanges between drug trafficking organizations and law enforcement authorities since 2006 (Buxton, 2012). Moreover, the ability of Central American governments to stem the flow of drugs and violence is minimal, and the optimal outcome that most of these nations can hope for is to minimize the so-called "bridge" factors that keep them vulnerable to drug trafficking activities (Buxton, 2012).

With respect to the ability of Mexico to respond to the growing threat, many authorities agree that there are few viable alternatives available. According to Kilmer and Caulkins (2010), "The difficulty is that, for Mexico, there are almost no alternative sources to the press, in either Mexico or the United States, which typically reports whatever large number a government agency chooses to provide" (p. 37). Currently, the Mexican government does not release this type of information so gauging the effectiveness of interdictions can be problematic (Kilmer & Caulkins, 2010). Although drug-related violence has become a global problem in recent years, this study focuses on these issues as they relate to the United States and Mexico as discussed further below.

Project Beginning

While precise numbers are not available, it is possible to estimate the amount of the revenues that are being generated by Mexican drug cartels each year, at least in a general fashion. For instance, Kilmer and Caulkins (2010) posit a scenario wherein heroin users in the United States spend $30 billion at an average retail price of $145 per pure gram, those figures translate into about 207 metric tons of pure heroin, an amount that is increased to 252 metric tons when the drug is cut to the 82% purity levels that are typical of U.S.-Mexico border trade. Based on these calculations, it is estimated that approximately $4.3 billion worth of heroin alone is being smuggled into the United States from Mexico, a figure that does not take into account marijuana or other drugs (Kilmer & Caulkins, 2010). Also assuming that Mexican drug trafficking organizations receive the standard 80% of the $4.3 billion total, their share comes to about $3.4 billion per year, and many authorities are concerned that a significant percentage of these funds are being diverted into terrorist organizations around the world, funding attacks against U.S. interests domestically and abroad as well as introducing a continuing supply of illicit drugs into American communities (Kilmer & Caulkins, 2010).

In particular, heroin from Mexico poses a formidable threat throughout Pennsylvania and Delaware, as evidenced by the increasing availability of high purity, low priced heroin and the resulting escalation in abuse, drug treatment admissions, and overdose deaths. This threat is exacerbated by the widely-reported trend of prescription drugs abusers migrating to heroin, seeking a cheaper and more available high. The DEA Philadelphia Division routinely assesses and ranks the drug threats to Philadelphia and the Delaware area as determined by availability, threat to public health, community impact, attendant crime, enforcement activity, seizures, drug abuse and treatment statistics, as well as propensity for abuse. Analysis of these factors, supplemented by investigative reporting, human intelligence, liaison, and open source data, allows for a comprehensive overview of each drug area, culminating in the ranking of drug threats throughout the Philadelphia and Delaware area. Based on the aforementioned analysis, for each the past five years, heroin has ranked as the primary drug threat to the Philadelphia area and the State of Delaware. In addition, in each reporting area (Allentown, Harrisburg, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and Scranton, Pennsylvania, as well as Wilmington, Delaware), heroin has ranked as either the primary or secondary drug threat in each of the last five years.

Theoretical Framework

This study used a novel theoretical framework since a viable theoretical framework for studying cross-border drug trafficking is not yet available (Campbell, 2009). Therefore, the theoretical frame was that the same financial incentives that are driving the heroin trade between Mexico and the United States by traditional drug trafficking organizations are also increasingly being used by terrorist organizations to fund attacks against the U.S. At home and abroad. In this regard, Campbell emphasizes that, "Cross-border drug trafficking cannot be fully understood without reference to international crime networks and global social and economic power structures" (2009, p. 38). Further, there remains a lack of a formal and standardized model concerning the primary factors contributing to violence in illicit drug markets in general and for Mexico in particular (Kilmer & Caulkins, 2010).

What is known for certain is that, "The commercial and organized character of illicit drug trafficking is given by the law of offer and request by the fact that acquiring as much profit as possible is the sole purpose of illegal drug trafficking networks" (Alecu, 2012, p. 283). In addition, law enforcement authorities have learned the hard way that drug trafficking organizations typically operate in a fashion that defeats the best abilities of the United States and its allies in combating the drug war (Campbell, 2009). In fact, it is the demand for drugs from developed nations such as the United States that fuels the enormous global drug markets (Campbell, 2009).

In addition, the violence that has erupted in some developing nations such as Mexico has been due to high levels of illicit drug production (Campbell, 2009). From this perspective, the developed nations of the world possess the capability to reduce drug consumption to some extent through pressure on developing nations (Campbell, 2009). As Campbell puts it, "Whether or not the United States is still the dominant world power, it is clearly in a superordinate relationship with Mexico and has been since taking half of the country in the Mexican War, even though this relationship is one of dominance without [cultural] hegemony" (2009, p. 38). It is within this convoluted and increasingly dangerous context that cross-border drug trafficking is taking place in the North American marketplace (Campbell, 2009).

Goal and Objectives

The overarching goal of this study was to deliver a critical and systematic review of the literature concerning drug trafficking and terrorism in general and its implications for U.S.-Mexico security relations to develop timely and informed answers to the following research questions which represented secondary objectives:

1. How serious is the trade in illicit drugs between Mexico and the United States today and what have been recent trends?

2. How does drug trafficking fund terrorist organizations in general and trade between Mexico and the U.S. In particular?

3. What interdictions have proven most effective in stemming the flow of drugs into the United States from Mexico?

4. What have been the implications of drug trafficking with Mexico on American communities in Pennsylvania and Delaware?

5. What further steps need to be implemented to reverse the tide of drugs and violence that continues to threaten Mexican-U.S. security relations?

Literature Review

Critical Assets Identification

The general objective of terrorist organizations is to compel other people to do their will, intimate other people, or to destabilize or otherwise destroy the support structures of a nation or an organization (Smith & McCusker, 2010). The motivations or rationales that are used by terrorist organizations vary, but typically include support for a specific religion, advancement of international recognition, to change a specific practice or policy (e.g., product testing on animals), political self-determination for minorities, or to accomplish a political ideology (Smith & McCusker, 2010).

To date, the primary responses to terrorist activities have included financial transaction monitoring and reporting (Smith & McCusker, 2010). This response is effective in two different ways: (1) by placing impediments in the path of those who seek to accrue and to move funds using the regulated financial sector and; (2) by enabling law enforcement and intelligence agencies to follow the financial trail of transactions left by those who make use of the regulated financial sector, so as to detect and to prevent possible attacks (Smith & McCusker, 2010, p. 2). In addition, there have been several other trends that have taken place in the international community in recent years that have affected responses to global terrorism. For instance, following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, there has been a significant decrease in state-funded terrorist activities and an increase in international condemnation (Levitt & Jacobson 2008). Consequently, many terrorist organizations have been forced to become self-supporting financially through drug trafficking (Levitt & Jacobson 2008).

Likewise, there has been a noticeable increase in so-called "homegrown" terrorism, especially in countries located outside of the primary conflict zones (Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman, 2009). Some analysts have maintained that these homegrown terrorist organizations are increasingly contacting international terrorist organizations for training and funding (Smith & McCusker, 2010). For instance, Smith and McCusker report that, "In the European Union (EU), the number of persons associated with home-grown extremist Muslim terrorist groups increased in 2008 owing to developments in conflict zones and politically unstable countries, such as North Africa, the Sahel region, Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India" (2010, p. 3). Moreover, there is growing concern over the increasing radicalization of Islamic communities in the Middle East and elsewhere (Smith & McCusker, 2010). Today's situation is a far cry from just a few decades ago when Osama bin Laden was not even a blip on the Drug Enforcement Agency's (DEA) radar. Indeed, the head of the DEA's international programs, John Warner, reported in 1984 that "among the transnational terrorist groups, the two Armenian ones stood out as the most ruthless and dangerous of all" (cited in Marshall, 2012, p. 155).

The recent budget for drug trafficking interdiction in the Western Hemisphere by country is set forth in Table 1 and depicted graphically in Figure 1 below.

Table 1

Recent drug trafficking interdiction budget

Regional

FY 2005

Actual

FY 2006

Actual

Western Hemisphere

Bahamas

Guatemala

2,820

2,475

Haiti

0

14,850

Jamaica

1,488

Mexico

39,680

39,600

Latin America Regional

3,224

2,475

Southern Cone

0

0

Caribbean and Central America (Transit Zone)

0

0

Subtotal Western Hemisphere

48,204

60,885

Source: U.S. Department of State (2006) International Narcotics Control Strategy Report at http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2006/vol1/html/62104.htm

Figure 1. Recent drug interdiction budget

Source: Based on tabular data in U.S. Department of State (2006) International Narcotics Control Strategy Report at http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2006/vol1/html/62104.htm

In addition, there is an increasing number of urban areas in the United States that participate in the nationwide High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas program, an undertaking run by the White House's Office of National Drug Control Policy (Fifer & Sturgeon, 2013). The purpose of the program is to reduce drug trafficking and production in the United States by:

Facilitating cooperation among Federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies to share information and implement coordinated enforcement activities;

Enhancing law enforcement intelligence sharing among Federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies;

Providing reliable law enforcement intelligence to law enforcement agencies to facilitate the design of effective enforcement strategies and operations; and Supporting coordinated law enforcement strategies that make the most of available resources to reduce the supply of illegal drugs in designated areas of the United States and in the nation as a whole (HIDTA program, 2014).

At present, there are 28 HIDTAs, a total that includes about 16% of all U.S. counties and approximately 60% of the American population (HIDTA program, 2014). Forty-six states as well as in Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia have HIDTA-designated counties (HIDTA program, 2014). Locally, HIDTAs are overseen by executive boards that are comprised of equal numbers of regional federal and non-federal (e.g., state, local, and tribal) law enforcement authorities (HIDTA program, 2014). The HIDTA program sponsors hundreds of national initiatives, including the following:

Enforcement initiatives comprising multi-agency investigative, interdiction, and prosecution activities;

Intelligence and information-sharing initiatives;

Support for programs that provide assistance beyond the core enforcement and intelligence and information-sharing initiatives; and Drug use prevention and drug treatment initiatives (HIDTA program, 2014).

In addition as part of their anti-drug strategies, several HIDTAs place a high priority on prevention and treatment such as:

The Southwest Border HIDTA - California Region works closely with more than a dozen other organizations on prevention initiatives, including drug courts, youth service organizations, and a U.S. Border Patrol program that works on youth drug use prevention.

In Washington, the Northwest HIDTA promotes links with drug courts, community coalitions, public awareness campaigns, and other groups to support initiatives to reduce substance abuse and prevent the initiation of drug use (HIDTA program, 2014).

Furthermore, the HIDTA program provides funding for projects that support HIDTAs by addressing specific drug trafficking concerns including:

The Domestic Marijuana Investigation Project

The National Methamphetamine and Pharmaceuticals Initiative

The Domestic Highway Enforcement Project (HIDTA program, 2014).

The federal programs are focused on combating major drug trafficking in the United States and to provide local and state law enforcement agencies with the resources they need to participate as active partners in the national effort to curb drug trafficking (Fifer & Sturgeon, 2013). According to Fifer and Sturgeon, "To date, drug trafficking organizations have been pushed out of other urban areas by similar efforts, only to move to regions that have the least resistance where there's not as much coordination between law enforcement agencies" (2013, p. 8).

In response, Congress passed the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA) after several previous efforts to develop an effective drug trafficking maritime enforcement power for American law enforcement authorities (Bouzid, 2011). Furthermore, pursuant to United States v. Matos-Luchi, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit determined for the first time that stateless vessels could be boarded and seized and the crew charged if the vessel was suspected of being used for drug trafficking purposes (Bouzid, 2011). In this regard, Bouzid adds that, "The court held that because the vessel failed to meet any of the criteria that would classify it as possessing nationality under the MDLEA, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) had authority to seize the vessel and subject the suspected traffickers to criminal prosecution in the United States" (2011, p. 459).

According to Burns (2013), lawmakers in the United States should not misunderstand or underestimate the severity of the problem. In this regard, Burns emphasizes that, "We're in the midst of a "war on trafficking." It's similar to the "war on drugs" and the "war on terror" in that we have removed these acts - drug use, terrorism, trafficking- from the contexts in which they occur" (p. 9). Successful prosecution of the "war on trafficking," though, requires a systematic and methodical approach that takes into account the various factors that contribute to drug trafficking besides the obvious. As Burns points out, "When we talk about trafficking, we need to think about both "push" and "pull" factors meaning, social factors like poverty and racism that push people to become vulnerable to begin with, as well as abusive or exploitative arrangements they may be pulled into because resources are inadequate" (p. 9). Successful prosecution of the war on trafficking, then, requires understanding and responding to the issues as they are rather than as the United States would prefer them to be. As Burns concludes, "Instead, we ignore all that and focus on the "bad people" - usually portrayed in the media as urban men of color kidnapping young, white girls. We assume that if we put them in prison, everything will be solved" (2013, p. 9). Unfortunately, the threat of drug trafficking organizations continues to grow in the Western Hemisphere, and these issues are discussed further below as they relate to an assessment of these threats.

Threat Assessment

Today, there are some independent Mexican drug traffickers to be sure, but the Mexican drug trafficking industry in general is widely regarded to be controlled by several large drug-trafficking organizations (Kilmer & Caulkins, 2010). Although hard facts are difficult to come by, most major drug trafficking organizations seem to be hierarchically organized and have clearly identifiable leadership (Kilmer & Caulkins, 2010). In some cases, organizations such as the Gulf and Sinaloa cartels have survived the removal of their leadership (Kilmer & Caulkins, 2010). According to Kilmer and Caulkins, "The configuration of organizations is not stable; new drug trafficking organizations emerge from established ones. For example, the Zetas, now a major trafficking group, were originally a set of ex-soldiers hired by the Gulf cartel to provide enforcement services" (2010, p. 38).

The drug trafficking organizations that have been around the longest typically began with marijuana sales during the 1970s when Mexico emerged as a dominant supplier to the United States (Astorga & Shirk, 2010). During this period in the history of Mexico-U.S. drug trafficking, a number of leaders were from the state of Sinaloa, situated on Mexico's northern Pacific coast (Astorga & Shirk, 2010). Currently, there remains a lack of evidence that any particular Mexican drug trafficking organization specializes in a certain type or types of drugs (Kilmer & Caulkins, 2010). Because Mexican drug trafficking organizations deal in a number of different types of illicit drugs, it is not possible to determine with any accuracy how much violence is attributable to heroin, marijuana, cocaine or other drugs (Kilmer & Caulkins, 2010). Many observers suggest that given marijuana's less harmful qualities, any violence must be related to other drugs. As Kilmer and Caulkins point out, though, "Marijuana-related violence may currently be a small part of the overall violence landscape in Mexico. However, one must also consider that marijuana may influence violence by keeping some potentially violent individuals on payrolls and/or providing revenue that is used to purchase weapons and ammunition" (2010, p. 38).

Besides Mexico, the threat of drug trafficking from Central American countries is also severe and complex. The governments of the Central American countries share a number of challenges in this area. For instance, Buxton (2012) reports that, "They are all small countries, tiny territories to police but geographically complex, with weak institutions, wedged between drug markets and producers north and south" (p. 250). Complicating matters even more is the fact that the Central American countries are permanent wedged into geographic locations where law enforcement is less effective or nonexistent (Buxton, 2012). In this regard, Buxton advises that, "Geography emerges as the most difficult bridging factor for these countries to address. Countries in the region possess long Caribbean and Pacific coast lines, micro islands, lagoons, mangrove swamps, deep-water ports, and the longest barrier reef in the hemisphere" (2012, p. 251). The Central American countries also contain continental roadways and links through the Panama Canal that facilitate drug trafficking (Buxton, 2012). According to Buxton, "In sum, they make for the perfect illicit drop-off and transit zone for methamphetamine and cocaine produced in Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia to be sold to markets in the U.S. And Europe" (2012, p. 251). Because there is so much money involved, the threat of drug trafficking from Latin and Central America remains exceedingly high. In this regard, Buxton concludes that, "This is a region where the security sector is weak, vulnerable to corruption, inefficient, and with a long history of involvement in the drugs trade. Impunity and lack of civilian oversight are ongoing problems" (2012, p. 251).

These assertions were confirmed in October 2008 when, following a 2-year collaborative investigation by Colombian and U.S. law enforcement authorities, the Colombian government charged 36 people with money laundering and drug trafficking (Jacobsen & Levitt, 2010). The connection between drug trafficking and terrorism was also made apparent during this operation. Law enforcement authorities reported that the drug trafficking organization they had disrupted consisted of expatriates from Lebanon who were transferring a percentage of the profits to the Hezbollah organization in Lebanon (Jacobsen & Levitt, 2010). Unfortunately, these types of "hybrid" drug trafficking organizations are becoming increasingly commonplace. In this regard, Jacobsen and Levitt (2010) point out that, "These "hybrid" organizations-part terrorist group, part organized crime network-are "meaner and uglier than anything law enforcement or militaries have ever faced" in the view of senior U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency officials" (2010, p. 119).

Although this increasingly close association between drug trafficking organizations and terrorist group is widely regarded as a growing threat from the perspective of the United States, these trends also represent new opportunities for American lawmakers (Jacobsen & Levitt, 2010). According to Jacobsen and Levitt, "As the nexus of terrorism and criminal activity intensifies, targeting terrorist groups' criminal activities becomes an increasingly effective strategy. Terrorist networks are becoming increasingly transnational and a key challenge in confronting them is achieving international cooperation in counterterrorism initiatives" (2010, p. 120).

These trends may help strengthen the position of the U.S. with the international community in prosecuting drug trafficking organizations since they have also began participating in regime-changing activities that threaten regional stability around the world (Jacobsen & Levitt, 2010). In this regard, Jacobsen and Levitt point out that, "By capitalizing on terrorists' increasing criminal activity, the Obama administration could leverage its strategy of international cooperation and diplomatic engagement to gain broader support against illicit financing of transnational threats" (2010, p. 120). Part of the problem, though, is the dynamic nature of drug trafficking organizations that fund terrorist groups. According to Jacobsen and Levitt, "The terrorist threat is not static. Terrorists adapt and evolve, partly in response to the very countermeasures we enact. As the terrorist threat has evolved, the means by which terrorist groups raise, store, and move funds have also changed and have often hindered government efforts to thwart terrorist activities" (2010, p. 120). The research to date confirms that terrorist organizations are in close communication and collaborate with one another on tactics and intelligence gathering, especially with respect to financing and supporting terrorist activities

(Jacobsen & Levitt, 2010).

Prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the al-Qaeda terrorist group provided resources and oversaw operations from Afghanistan (Jacobsen & Levitt, 2010). Thereafter, al-Qaeda subsequently funded the embassy bombings in East Africa in 1998, the attack on the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen in 2000, and the 9/11 World Trade Center attacks (Jacobsen & Levitt, 2010). According to Jacobsen and Levitt, "Today, the terrorist threat is more decentralized, with the al-Qaeda core no longer funding other terrorist groups, cells, or operations as they did in the past. Local cells are being increasingly left to fund their own activities" (2010, p. 120). This is not to say, though, that terrorist groups rely on drug trafficking funding solely, but it is to say that a majority of their funding is coming from illicit drug trade. According to Jacobsen and Levitt (2010), "While many fundraising techniques remain popular, including abuse of charities and otherwise legitimate businesses, terrorist cells increasingly engage in criminal activity to fund their actions. For example, an al-Qaeda affiliate in Southeast Asia, helped to finance the 2002 Bali bombings by robbing jewelry stores. Another example is the 2005 attacks in London, which were partially financed by credit card fraud" (p. 121).

In fact, terrorist groups receive funding from a wide range of illegal activities, ranging from counterfeit goods to cigarette smuggling, but there is growing evidence that the lion's share of funding for terrorist groups is being derived from drug trafficking money (Jacobsen & Levitt, 2010). The DEA reports that 19 out of 43 designated foreign terrorist organizations have been positively linked with the illicit global drug trade, and as many as 60% percent of terrorist groups have links with the illicit drug industry (Jacobsen & Levitt, 2010). A good example of this arrangement was the Madrid train bombings in 2004 that killed nearly 200 people and which were funded in large part by the sale of hashish (Jacobsen & Levitt, 2010).

The amounts of money that are involved in the illicit global drug trade are staggering. The United Nations has estimated that the illicit global drug industry pulls in around $322 billion each year, making illicit drug trafficking the most profitable terrorist group activity by far (Jacobsen & Levitt, 2010). In addition, besides drug trafficking revenues, illicit drugs can generate revenue for terrorist organizations through taxes on local cartels and farmers (Jacobsen & Levitt, 2010). According to Jacobsen and Levitt, "Groups like the Afghan Taliban, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the Kurdistan Workers' Party, and Lebanon's Hizbollah generate significant revenue from extortion fees collected from drug cartels and poppy or coca farmers operating in their territory" (2010, p. 121).

Although drug trafficking may appear to be a suboptimal funding method for any type of religious group, the terrorist organizations that are using drug trafficking to raise funds justify the practice by rationalizing its ultimate impact on their enemies. For example, in 2006, a member of the Taliban, Khan Mohammed, was sentenced to life in prison for drug trafficking and narco-terrorism who characterized his activities in drug trafficking as being based on a "desire to see God turn all the infidels into corpses -- whether it is by opium or by shooting, this is our common goal" (cited in Jacobsen & Levitt, 2010, p. 121). Likewise, a leader of Fatah al-Islam, a terrorist group in Lebanon that has links with al-Qaeda, rationalized bank robberies by the organization by claiming they were "stealing money from the infidels" and "their institutions is something that Allah has permitted us to do," pointing out that the stolen money was rather "directed towards jihad" (cited in Jacobsen & Levitt, 2010, p. 119)

Different terrorist organizations generate revenues from drug trafficking differently. For example, the Taliban is independent in Afghanistan, and manages its own bases and training camps, territorial holdings, smuggles weapons and generally controls all aspect of their illicit drug production (Jacobsen & Levitt, 2010). Not surprisingly, the Taliban has struggled to maintain control over its geographic holdings in recent years despite repeated efforts by the United States and the DEA to half the flow of drugs from Taliban-held country (Jacobsen & Levitt, 2010). According to Jacobsen and Levitt, "Indeed, an increasing number of DEA arrests in recent years have targeted drug kingpins closely tied to the Taliban, such as Baz Mohammad and Haji Juma Ka Khan. In October 2005, the U.S. government formally extradited Mohammad from Afghanistan to New York" p. 119). The DEA reports that Mohammad Khan was a "Taliban-linked narco-terrorist" who had been responsible for conspiring to smuggle in excess of $25 million worth of heroin into the United States and other countries from Afghanistan (Jacobsen & Levitt, 2010). The charges filed in the United States against Khan, who was the first defendant to be prosecuted pursuant to the 2006 Federal Narco-Terrorism statute, alleged that Khan had "trafficked massive quantities of drugs with the intent to support a terrorist organization" (cited in Jacobsen & Levitt, 2010, p. 120)

Today, many retired Cold Warriors can be heard to lament the "good old days" of communism when the threats arrayed against the United States were state-sponsored and well-known. By very sharp contrast, the nebulous quality of most terrorist organizations means that they can operate with impunity and, lacking state sponsors, there is no geographic area that can be targeted in response. In some ways, though, these trends can be regarded as positive. For instance, Jacobsen and Levitt point out that, "All things considered, the growing nexus between international terrorism and organized crime may actually be a positive development. For one, tracking terrorists for their illicit activities, rather than their terrorism-based endeavors, is less complicated" (p. 120). In addition, although some nations may vacillate about waging a war on terrorism because of differing definitions, there is a universal consensus among the international community concerning the need to fight crime (Jacobsen & Levitt, 2010).

The historical record also confirms that some other nations have the means and wherewithal to ally with the United States in waging a global war on terror, other countries are less willing or even reluctant to participate in counterterrorism efforts for a number of reasons. For example, some nations may not want to publicly confirm that they have a problem with terrorism because it reflects poorly on their abilities to deal with the issues effectively. Other countries may be reluctant to cooperate with the United States in the global war on terrorism simply by virtue of its being the unpopular "Great Satan" with its neighboring countries (Jacobsen & Levitt, 2010). According to Jacobsen and Levitt, "The governments in the Tri-Border Area of Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil, where Hizbollah, Hamas, and other terrorist organizations have had a long-standing presence, is a good example of the former" (p. 120). A good example of this reluctance occurred in December 2006 when the U.S. Treasury charged a number of Lebanese expatriates in the Tri-Border Area as terrorists due to their affiliations with Hizbollah. The three governments of the Tri-Border Area responded by issuing a joint statement that cleared the Lebanese suspects of all charges and rejected the U.S. claims of their terrorist activities in the Tri-Border Area (Jacobsen & Levitt, 2010).

It is important to note, though, that a 2007 U.S. State Department annual report on terrorism also determined that the governments of Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil are much more aggressive in prosecuting other criminal activities in this region: "The governments of the Tri-Border Area have long been concerned with arms and drugs smuggling, document fraud, money laundering, and the manufacture and movement of contraband goods through this region" (cited in Jacobsen & Levitt, 2010, p. 120). These incidents indicate that it would be in the best interests of the United States to collaborate with the governments of Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil on drug-related crime enforcement rather than pursuing counter-terrorism cooperation (Jacobsen & Levitt, 2010).

This alternative strategy is attractive since it involves no substantive changes to the legal structures of other countries nor does it require any reorganization of governmental agencies (Jacobsen & Levitt, 2010). As Jacobsen and Levitt conclude, "Drug laws are comprehensive and ubiquitous; governments must simply enforce existing laws and hold terrorists accountable for their transgressions. Enforcing domestic laws is not a political statement, but merely a function of law and order and of national sovereignty" (2010, p. 120).

Although the global war on terrorism remains in relative infancy, there have been some real-world examples of how these different strategies play out. For example, Kenya provides a useful example of how the law enforcement approach can be used to fight narco-terrorism. For instance, according to Jacobsen and Levitt, "Kenya lacks stringent counterterrorism laws, but could effectively combat terrorism by enforcing domestic criminal legislation" (2010, p. 120). An important point made by Jacobsen and Levitt is that in some parts of the world, the global war on terrorism is actually viewed as a war on Islam by the United States. In this regard, Jacobsen and Levitt point out that, "U.S. authorities commenting on terrorism in Kenya have drawn negative responses from Kenyan officials; the Kenyan government views such public statements as unfriendly act[s] and threat[s] to the country's vital tourism industry" (2010, p. 120).

There are some pragmatic reasons behind this approach as well. For instance, charges of criminal activity are easier to substantiate than crimes of terrorism. Successfully prosecuting an individual for terrorism requires evidence that may be difficult or even impossible to obtain in some countries (Jacobsen & Levitt, 2010). In addition, even when evidence is produced, it may be challenged as inadmissible, rejected as being detrimental to national security interests or viewed as being an undesirable public acknowledgment of cooperation with the United States (Jacobsen & Levitt, 2010). By contrast, criminal charges are far easier to prove and prosecute (Jacobsen & Levitt, 2010). According to Jacobsen and Levitt, "Zacarias Moussaoui's prosecution on terrorism-related grounds provides a paradigmatic example of the difficulties in trying suspected terrorists. Although the "20th hijacker" ultimately pleaded guilty, the trial persisted for more than three and a half years as a result of disputed intelligence" (2010, p. 120).

Another important point made by Jacobsen and Levitt is that every successful prosecution of a terrorist suspect as a terrorist rather than an ordinary criminal provides additional support for further prosecutions. In this regard, Jacobsen and Levitt report that, "Redefining terrorists as criminals sullies the upright reputation they seek to portray among their followers, be it as "freedom fighters" or principled religious activists" (2010, p. 120). Therefore, redefining terrorists as the criminals they actually are also removes the perception of these individuals as being religiously motivated. For instance, Jacobsen and Levitt report that, "Publicly pursuing terrorists through the criminal activity track taints the political, religious, or practical legitimacy so critical to building financial support and recruiting operatives for terrorism" (2010, p. 120). Based on the foregoing, Jacobsen and Levitt predict that the 2006 Federal Narco-Terrorism statute will become an even more important tool in underscoring the involvement of terrorist organizations in drug trafficking activities (Jacobsen & Levitt, 2010).

Although every terrorist organization is unique in some fashion, this strategy could be used to good effect with some groups such as the Lebanon-based Hizbollah. According to Jacobsen and Levitt, "The United States and many of its allies, particularly the Europeans, disagree on whether or not Hizbollah is a terrorist organization. There is far more agreement, however, that Hizbollah's global criminal activities and infrastructure pose a serious problem and need to be addressed" (2010, p. 120). The European Union (EU) has not yet determined that Hizbollah or any part of it is a terrorist organization; however, the EU did include several members of Hizbollah as being culpable in a series of terrorist acts (Jacobsen & Levitt, 2010). Perhaps because of the social work performed by the group, the United Kingdom has even been hesitant to call all parts of Hizbollah a terrorist organization (Jacobson & Levitt, 2010). In fact, the UK government even announced that it was rejoining negotiations with the political arm of Hizbollah in March 2009 (Jacobsen & Levitt, 2010). According to Jacobsen and Levitt, "Unlike the United States, which has blacklisted the entire Hizbollah organization, the United Kingdom has banned only Hizbollah's terrorist (External Security Organization) and military wings" (p. 120). The ban on Hizbollah's military wing was in response to the group's announcement that it intended to increase its support to Palestinian and Iraqi militants in March 2008 (Jacobsen & Levitt, 2010).

Notwithstanding the sharp differences between U.S. And EU policies regarding Hizbollah, law enforcement against drug trafficking is one area where the U.S. And its European allies agree. According to Jacobsen and Levitt, "The United States and its European counterparts have a particularly strong interest in combating Hizbollah's burgeoning role in illicit drug trafficking" (2010, p. 120). Irrespective of various definitions of what constitutes terrorism, drug trafficking is an area where law enforcement activities are well established and recognized as essential to national security. In this area, Hizbollah stands alone as having engaged in criminal activities to fund its operations longer than any other Islamic group (Jacobsen & Levitt, 2010).

In this regard, Jacobsen and Levitt report that, "While Hizbollah is involved in a wide variety of criminal activities, its role in the production and trafficking of narcotics is particularly salient. Hizbollah has capitalized on the vast Lebanese Shi'a expatriate population, mainly located in South America and Africa" (p. 120). Using its well established position in Africa as a springboard, Hizbollah has exploited the strategic location to generate and transfer monies to support their international terrorist activities (Jacobsen & Levitt, 2010).

A survey of security analysts concerning the situation in Mexico found that the country was woefully under prepared across virtually all the rating measures related to counternarcotics, counterterrorism and border and maritime security along the following scale:

1. Very low: entirely lacking

2. Low: beginning to develop

3. Neither low nor high: minimal but functioning

4. High: functional but room for development

5. Very high: strong and no major improvement needed.

Generally, the respondents scored all of Mexico's capabilities across the three security issues at 3.18 or below, indicating that Mexico's core capabilities related to these three security issues are minimal but functioning at best and entirely lacking at worst (Paul & Schaefer, 2011). The respondents' average rating for capabilities in each of the three security issues was low as shown in Table 2 and depicted graphically in Figure 2 below.

Table 2

Assessment of Mexico's Counternarcotics Capabilities

Sector

Rating

Control corruption in counternarcotics operations

1.27

Integrate military and law enforcement operational support

1.82

Police, prosecute and incarcerate drug traffickers

1.91

Maintain law and order (public safety)

1.91

Train civilians and military forces in counternarcotics operations

2.09

Control roadways, airspace and waterways

2.1

Develop rapid and mobile reaction capabilities based on real-time intelligence

2.18

Collect intelligence on narcotics traffickers

2.36

Establish drug eradication and interdiction programs

2.45

Maintain border and coastal security

2.55

Average

2.1

Source: Based on table in Paul & Schaefer, 2011, p. 70

Figure 2. Sector assessment of Mexico's core counternarcotics capabilities

Source: Based on tabular data in Paul & Schaefer, 2011, p. 70

The respondents rated all of Mexico's counternarcotics capabilities as being either low or very low while the scores for Mexico's counternarcotics capabilities ranged from a high score of 2.55 for the country's capability to maintain border and coastal security to a low score of 1.27 for its capability to control corruption in counternarcotics operations (Paul & Schaefer, 2011). The average score assigned by the respondents across all the capabilities related to counternarcotics was 2.10 (Paul & Schaefer, 2011).

Vulnerability Assessment

The average annual per capita GDP in Mexico is below $5,000, and local economies provide few employment opportunities, especially for younger people just entering the job market (Buxton, 2012). Moreover, despite the promises of the North American Free Trade Agreement, many regions of Mexico remains impoverished, further contributing to an environment in which drug traffickers can prosper (Buxton, 2012). Vulnerability to drug trafficking becomes even more severe when law enforcement authorities are corrupt and when drug traffickers change their routine to avoid detection and capture (Campbell, 2009).

Innovations in technology and communications equipment in recent years have facilitated the fight against drug trafficking in North America, including the disruption of activities to plan, coordinate, and execute their criminal activities (Disrupt drug trafficking and its facilitation of other transnational threats, 2012). Consequently, a growing number of drug trafficking organizations have transformed into "versatile, loose networks that cooperate intermittently but maintain their independence. They operate worldwide and employ sophisticated technology and financial savvy" (Disrupt drug trafficking, 2012, para. 2). A particularly insidious aspect of these criminal organizations is their ability to circumvent the law through bribery or threats as well as their ability to exploit weaknesses in border security and law enforcement operations (Disrupt drug trafficking, 2012).

At present, Mexico's security sector does not possess the ability to effectively respond to drug trafficking and terrorism, and the country's land and maritime borders are also vulnerable to exploitation by terrorist organizations (Paul & Schaefer, 2011). To date, the Mexican government has succeeded in gathering a significant amount of intelligence concerning drug trafficking organizations operating in its territory, but here again, corruption -- even at the highest levels -- can derail anti-drug trafficking operations (Paul & Schaefer, 2011). Indeed, Paul and Schaefer emphasize that, "Corruption in the forces of order is the single biggest barrier to effectively opposing the drug trafficking organizations" (p. 127). Some observers, though, fail to identify any actions that indicate the Mexican government is actively working to combat drug trafficking or terrorist organizations; rather, the current emphasis seems to be characterizing local groups as being terrorists (Paul & Schaefer, 2011). In fact, Paul and Schaefer (2011) are of the mind that if the United States was not involved in combating drug trafficking from Mexico, there would be little or nothing substantive accomplished. In this regard, Paul and Schaefer (2011) report that, "Mexico's ability to disrupt financing by terrorist or insurgent groups from within or outside the country is perhaps the greatest shortcoming of the Mexican strategy and plan to fight narcoterrorism. There is really no evidence that Mexico is capable of doing this without the support and leadership of American intelligence" (p. 128).

Despite the fears of the U.S. government that the cartel-related violence that is wracking Mexico today will spill over the borders into the United States, the violence appears to be headed south into Central American countries (Carpenter, 2012). As Carpenter points out, "That may prove to be only minor comfort to U.S. officials, though, because the expanding influence of the Mexican cartels is posing a security threat to fragile Central American countries" (2012, p. 33).

If drug-related violence continues to spill into the countries of Central America, the region of the hemisphere could once again become a major foreign policy issue for the United States (Carpenter, 2012). Indeed, the spread of violence into the Central American countries is believed to be due in part to the actions being taken by the Mexican government to curtail drug trafficking activities in the country (Carpenter, 2012). The chief of operations for the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, David Gaddis, characterized the move into Central America as a natural eventuality given the circumstances. In this regard, Gaddis advised that, "They are dispersing some of their operations to safer arenas. The cartels are moving into countries where they feel, quite frankly, more comfortable than they do in Mexico" (cited in Carpenter, 2012, p. 33).

Some indication of this transition into Central America can be discerned from an interview with Honduran political leader Julian Aristides Gonzalez with Time magazine in December 2009. During the interview, Gonzalez noted that during his 6-year tenure, he had witnessed the numbers of Mexican cartels that had relocated to Honduras increase dramatically. According to Gonzalez, "Almost all of the big Mexican organizations are carving out territory here. And when they run into each other, they will fight over it" (cited in Carpenter, 2012, p. 33). Ironically, Gonzalez was murdered a short time after his interview with Time magazine (Carpenter, 2012).

In another time and another place, these events might not be so troubling, but the events that are transpiring south of the U.S. border are harbingers of what may yet come. In this regard, Carpenter emphasizes that, "What is so worrisome about the mounting presence of the drug cartels in Central America is the vulnerability and overall weakness of the region. There has been speculation that the violence in Mexico could ultimately cause that country to become a "failed state" (p. 33). Certainly, the United States does not want and cannot afford a failed state on its southern border, but there are some positive signs on the horizon as well that may help counter the current drug-trafficking trends that are emerging from Central America. Although concerns about drug trafficking are legitimate, Mexico does have some other attributes that will likely help avoid it from becoming the failed state that many observers fear. For instance, Carpenter points out that, "For all of its problems, Mexico still maintains powerful institutions that serve to keep the country relatively stable. One is the Catholic Church, a prosperous, well-organized and pervasive factor in Mexico" (2012, p. 34). Another institution that provides Mexico with stability is its business community that has significant interests in combating drug trafficking by the cartels. According to Carpenter, "There are three stable political parties that have the same incentive and impressive capabilities. Though Mexico faces a serious threat from the drug cartels -- and there are a few areas of the country in which the government's writ has become precariously weak -- it is still a long way from becoming a failed state" (2012, p. 34).