Mind Body Mindy/Body Separation: Spinoza

Mind Body

Mindy/Body Separation: Spinoza and Descartes

In his Ethics, Spinoza makes the assertion that, "the object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body." What Spinoza essentially argues is that all experience is ultimately experience of the body, as the body is the source of all experience -- i.e. It is only through the body and its processes that experience can be had, in Spinoza's view. Any concept of the mind, then -- any "idea constituting the human mind" -- is really an deal of the body, or at least a concept mediated by the body, as is everything else. An individual cannot truly come to know their mind, then, in this view, but rather they can only come to understand their body's perception of the mind and thus come to know their body through an investigation of the mind. This is not the only view on the subject of the mind and body, however, and Descartes would perhaps entirely disagree and certainly amplify and more completely describe the implications of Spinoza's thinking through his own thoughts on the subject.

According to Descartes, there exists what he terms a "real distinction" between mind and body. The body, according to Descartes' model of the mind-body split, is an unthinking yet extended (that is, physically extant, so far as can be determined) substance, while the mind is a thinking yet un-extended (non-corporeal, in our experience) substance. In this construct, there is a very real difference in the inherent nature of the substances of the mind and body, and thus there exists this "real distinction" -- what Descartes perceives as an undeniable and self-evident delineation of the two types of substances. The body can only be known through the mediation of the mind, in this construct, as the mind is the only substance capable of thought.

The implications of Spinoza's thinking in light of Descartes' assertions of the mind-body split ultimately come to nothing. If the real distinction between the mind and body exists as Descartes insists it does, then the object of the idea constituting the human mind cannot be the body except through a mistake made in the mind (or in the body) and its thinking process. That is, it is through a misconception of the mind that confuses perception with rational understanding that such a conclusion would be drawn, in Descartes' own experience. Pushing Spinoza's logic to its limits reveals the rectitude of Descartes' own assessment of the real distinction between the thinking mind and the unthinking body. If all thought and experience comes through the body as Spinoza insists, and thus the concept of the mind is truly an understanding of the body, then how can the body come to know itself? That is, would not all information regarding the experience of the body be mediated and limited by the body itself, and thus prone to the errors that bodies are prone to? If this is the case, and the mind is truly of the fallible and self-reflective body, how could anything thought of the mind be trusted? There would be no way to be certain the mind or body exist at all, despite the fact that though exists. The mind can know its existence, in Descartes' frameworks, specifically because it is thinking yet un-extended.