Lafleur vs. Cleveland Sometimes it

Lafleur vs. Cleveland

Sometimes it is easy to forget that what is taken for granted in the year 2005 was not always a fact in earlier years -- even a few decades ago. Such is the case with maternity leave. Today, there is no prescribed time for a pregnant woman to stop working. It depends on a variety of factors such as physical health, energy level, ease or complication of the pregnancy, doctors recommendations and the specific job. Some women begin their leave in the seventh or eighth month. Others work up until the last week, or even day of their term.

One of the classic Supreme Court cases in 1974, Cleveland Board of Education vs. Jo Carol Lafleur (on behalf of her and two other teachers), argued against the requirement that pregnant teachers had to leave their positions no less than five months before their due dates and to take unpaid maternity leave during their absence.

In this case, the teachers noted that this mandatory maternity leave was too restrictive and strictly limited their constitutional liberty to make personal reproductive decisions. The Cleveland School District, in its defense, argued that such a policy allowed the schools to provide educational continuity to those pupils affected by the teacher's pregnancy and to protect the safety of the students, teachers, and unborn children since some pregnant teachers were too physically incapacitated to handle their teaching duties.

As a result, the Court realized the schools' issue but did not find merit in their argument, because the rationale for the policies was not factually supported. The policy did not rectify the concern of continuity since two of the teachers, LaFleur and Nelson, were told to leave their positions in March, rather than remain in the classroom to finish the school year and offer the continuity the district claimed it desired. The third teacher, Cohen, could have provided more continuity for her students if she had completed the first semester ending in January rather than taking a mandated leave at the beginning of December.

The Court also found that the school systems' irrebuttable presumption that pregnant teachers are not physically able to perform their duties contrary to due process. This was especially true since the teachers in the case were each medically and physically capable of handing their teaching responsibilities. Despite the fact that some pregnant teachers cannot meet the physical demands of their employment, others do not have any physiological limitations. Justice Stewart, who delivered the Court's opinion, that the "rules sweep too broadly" when concerning being incapacitated to perform one's duties:

The provisions amount to a conclusive presumption that every pregnant teacher who reaches the fifth or sixth month of pregnancy is physically incapable of continuing [to work]. There is no individualized determination by the teacher's doctor -- or the school board's -- as to any particular teacher's ability to continue at her job. The rules contain an irrebuttable presumption of physical incompetency, and that presumption applies even when the medical evidence as to the individual woman's physical status might be wholly to the contrary. (Skotzko 65).

The Court did not say what it considered an appropriate time to take leave. It instead alluded to the fact that the woman, herself, with the advice and certification of her physician, should decide when to leave and when to resume work. The Court also did not indicate whether this ruling shoud apply to private institutions. Thus, such determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis.

The one dissenting Justice Rehnquist, along with the Chief Justice, viewed the majority decision in terms of philosophical controversy over the validity of presumptions as bases of lawmaking. In his opinion, Justice Stewart "enlists the Court in another quixotic engagement in his apparently unending war on irrebuttable presumptions" (Skotzko 66-67). In other words, it was Rehnquist's consise message that a law will remedy some problems equally well for all to whom it may apply must be the basis of modern legislation. There was a time in pre-Parliament England when "controversies were determined on an individualized basis without benefit of any general law. Most students of government consider the shift from this sort of determination...to a relatively uniform body of rules enancted by a body exercising legislative authority, to have been a significant move forward in the acheivement of a civilized political society."