Truman was incensed. The battle in Washington was soon drawing bigger headlines than the battle in Korea. (Ibid)
Many theorists in the 1950's saw the Chinese involvement as being part of an overall communist plot to dominate the world. They saw little distinction between Chinese and Russian involvement in the Korean War but rather saw the war as a combined effort at communist dominance.
In the 1950s, Western scholars, strongly influenced by the intensifying Cold War, generally viewed China's entrance into the Korean War as a reflection of a well-coordinated Communist plot of worldwide expansion, believing that the entire international
Communist movement was under the control of Moscow, and that neither Beijing nor Pyongyang had the freedom to make their own foreign policy decisions. The Korean conflict, therefore, was seen as an essential part of a life-and-death confrontation between the Communists on the one hand and the "free world" on the other.
Jian, Chen)
These theorists were convinced that Beijing's involvement in the Korean
War was part of Moscow's overall Cold War strategy. However, this view was challenged by researchers and theorist like Allen S. Whiting who believed that the suggested close unity between Russia and China in the Korean conflict was erroneous and that China was not involved in the initial planning of the conflict and had in fact attempted to halt the conflict.
After the outbreak of the Korean War, Whiting believed, Beijing tried to terminate the conflict through political settlement, and only after the attempts for a political solution failed in late August 1950 did Beijing begin necessary military preparations in early September.
In his analysis Whiting used resources from newspapers and journals of the time as well as Western intelligence resources to come to these conclusions. This would suggest that China did not have as much influence on the cause and event of the Korean War from a political point-of-view as the Russians. Whiting goes on to suggest from his sources that it becomes clear that China was in fact actively opposed to the enlargement of the conflict and went to some lengths to avoid any escalation. He suggests that Beijing entered the war only after Washington had ignored all warnings of the escalating conflict. To the Chinese the actions of Washington and General Douglas MacArthur, in proceeding with the conflict, indicated that the safety of the Chinese-Korean border was in danger. (ibid) Whiting also posits that the central reason for Chinese involvement in the Korean crisis was that they saw America as a threat to their national security, and not because they were involved in a plot with the U.S.S.R. For world dominance. (ibid)
This view was later endorsed by many researchers in the field who claimed that Chinese involvement was mainly due to fears about their security, more than anything else. "Building on Whiting's thesis, scholars paid more attention to Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders' concerns for China's national security as the decisive factor underlying their decision to enter the Korean War." (ibid)
Theorists also bolstered this argument by stating that China could ill afford a war at that particular stage of its development as it faced a difficult period of both political and economic reconstruction. (ibid) China was also involved with the problem of "liberating" nationalist controlled Taiwan. (ibid) They also contend that if the U.S. forces had not crossed the 38th Parallel then China would not have become embroiled in the conflict as it would not have perceived the United Stated as threat to its own security. This view is further endorsed by other readings of the Chinese involvement in the war.
PRC's intervention in Korea was primarily precipitated by its own security concerns. In his telegram to premier Zhou Enlai on Oct. 13, 1950, Chinese leader Mao Zedong summarized the rationale for sending troops to repel advancing U.S. forces: if PRC did not take the initiative, then U.S. forces would press on China along the Yalu river, China's northeastern defense force would be pinned down, Southern Manchuria's power supply (generated from hydroelectric plants in North Korea) would be controlled by hostile forces, and the situation would have resulted in the uprising of domestic and international "reactionary elements." (Dongxiao Yue,)
In contrast to this theory there are other academics who question a too simplistic analysis of Chinese motives in entering the Korean War. They see a complex set of factors that are related to the way that China perceives itself in the international areas at that time.
In this regard one could also include the fact that the decision to go to war was also influenced by the already poor relationship and distrust...
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