Dueling Perspectives on the 1967 Six Day War: Why Popp Provides the More Convincing Argument

Introduction

The Six Day War remains a controversial event in Arab-Israeli history not only because of the considerable expansion of Israels territory that resulted from the War but also because of how the circumstances of the War have been interpreted by scholars and historians. Louis and Shlaim contend that the War was not something Israels government had wanted (26); yet, Popp shows that Israels government was adamant in arguing to Washington that a war was imminent even as McNamara insisted that Israel was misinterpreting the extent to which the Arab states posed a serious threat to Israels security (301). It is true that the Israels IDF was notorious for its hawkish rhetoric and that the Arab states had taken the IDFs words of provocationparticularly those of Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabinas inflammatory: Rabins strong language was widely interpreted in the Arab world as a signal of Israels intent to overthrow the Syrian regime by force (25). Thus, if the rhetoric of Rabin was of this nature, the argument of Shlaim that Israel was seeking to avoid war is unconvincing. More convincing is the argument of Popp that Israel was maneuvering for a great victory and was using the supposed threat of attack by the Arab states as a pretext for its own rapid expansion.

Background

Shlaim argues in Israel: Poor Little Samson, that Israel had no agreed policy and no coherent strategy regarding how to deal with Syria (25). The government held a defensive position while the IDF maintained an offensively-minded stance. In other words, the IDF sought an escalation of conflict, while the government sought to prevent an outbreak of war (Shlaim 25). Yet Louis and Shlaim also contend that in-fighting on the Arab side, especially between Nasser and the Syrians, led to the defeat of the Arab armies of Egypt, Syria and Jordan in the Six Day War. But if a lack of a coherent strategy on one side made a significant difference in that sides defeat, why did it impact the Israeli side less so? Popp shows, on the contrary, that the Israeli government was attempting to convince Washington that Egypt was planning a serious imminent attack: One of these warnings was even sent into a meeting of Eban with Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Earle G. Wheeler on May 26 (Popp 301). Washington had surmised that Israel was seeking to show to the US that war was unavoidable and had landed upon a preemptive strategy as grounds for a proper response. Yet as Popp notes, McNamara had already cautioned Eban that the issue before us should not be a preemptive attack by Israel but how to prevent hostilities (301). As Popp explains, Washington remained skeptical of the Arab threat to Israel in the days leading up to the attack. Even President Johnson viewed the Arab states military posturing as non-threatening in the face of Israels superior military might: Our best judgment is that no military attack on Israel is imminent, and, moreover, if Israel is attacked, our judgment is that the Israelis would lick them, said Johnson (Popp 304). If, as Louis and Shlaim also contend, the Arab states were disorganized and suspicious of one anothers aims, and that in less than a week Israel was able to quadruple its size by taking the West Bank, East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights, how is one to interpret the War as anything other than a calculated nexus on the part...

…planning a strategic assault on Israel at alland the outcome of the war was the same as had been occurring in Palestine for 20 years: further loss of Arab lands to Israel and an increased consolidation of power by Israel.

The outcome of the war considerably benefited Israel as well, allowing it to further its own expansionist program. The outcome of the War created a euphoric sense of victory throughout Israel, which celebrated with victory coins minted to honor the momentous occasion. The Jewish diaspora also viewed the Six Day War as a major turning point in the fortunes of Israel in the Middle East. Jewish immigration to Israel began to increase dramatically in the wake of the war, and the Jewish population of the state swelled.

But in the Arab states, the reaction against the Jewish population was swift and severe. The Arab states saw the war as an atrocity, and unfavorable popular opinion as well as governmental action led to a Jewish emigration from Arab states into Israel. The UN offered Resolution 242 calling for the withdrawal of Israel from occupied territories; but it would be another 12 years before Israel would agree to hand over Sinai to Egypt, following the Camp David Accords, and it would not be until 2006 that Israel would remove its military from Gaza.

The Six Day War was a turning point in the Middle East. The war enabled Israel to quadruple its size in a matter of days. It seized control of all of Mandatory Palestine, the Golan Heights and the Sinai. Its justification for the pre-emptive strike on Egypt was not supported by the necessary conditions for pre-emptive war, yet Israel nonetheless made the case that these conditions had been met. The Arab-Israeli conflict would continue for decades and even today remains a major and…