Iranian Nuclear Ambitions and American

Iranian Nuclear Ambitions and American Options

Iran is Persian Gulf oil-rich country that insists that it needs nuclear power for civilian purposes. Strong pressure from the United States in the form of economic sanctions and political isolation have not deterred Iran from its nuclear ambitions, and demands for inspection by the world community of nuclear regulators to ensure against military use of nuclear technology in Iran have been unproductive.

Given the geopolitical relationships in the region, (and the unnecessary redundancy of nuclear power and vast resources of Persian Gulf oil), it is highly unlikely that Iran's only intentions are to develop nuclear power facilities for civilian use. It has already installed thousands of high-speed centrifuges in cascades used to enrich Uranium, and without international oversight, it is impossible to verify that the enrichment process is being used to produce low-grade Uranium from weapons-usable grades capable of incorporation into nuclear weapons of war (Cirincione, 2007).

Israel, and India, rather than the United States, are the likely targets of any Iranian militaristic intentions, and Iranian President Ahmadinejad has made very clear that he hopes to wipe Israel off the face of the Earth. Analysts suggest that the Iranian president does not actually possess the authority over the Iranian military and that the regime itself is not likely to pursue the radical course of action advocated so vocally by Ahmadinejad.

Nevertheless, Israel has indicated its commitment to prevent Iran from ever developing the capacity for an operational nuclear weapons program, and many within the U.S. administration view a nuclear Iran as a global threat that is so great as to warrant

U.S. attack on Iranian nuclear facilities if international pressures and sanctions against unsupervised nuclear technology in Iran are ultimately unsuccessful.

The Military Threat of a Nuclear Iran::

In all likelihood, the United States does not have to fear directly from a nuclear- armed Iran, in fact, given the realities of the doctrine of mutually assured destruction

MAD) that prevailed for most of the second half of the last century between the East and West, it is arguable that even Israel would be attacked directly by Iran, because any such attack would ensure its own destruction in response. On the other hand, in light of the nature of radical Islamic beliefs, the current Jihad inspired by Osama bin Laden and Al

Qaeda, and Israel's ongoing experience with suicidal attacks, it is perfectly understandable that Israel may not be comfortable relying on MAD to protect herself from nuclear annihilation by Muslim fanatics who consider themselves "martyrs" in the name of Allah,

Unlike Israel, the U.S. is far enough from Iran that even in the worst case scenario of a regime change to one much more radical than the clerical establishment currently led by Ayatollah Khamenei, we are safe from a military nuclear attack, simply by virtue of Iran's inability to produce intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) technology capable of such distant reach (Cirincione, 2007).

Non-Military Threats of a Nuclear Iran:

By far, the U.S. is more at risk from potential Iranian ties to Al Qaeda and from unofficial support for the global Jihad against the U.S. On the part of elements in the Iranian administration sympathetic to terrorist ambitions. In the case of terrorists, we are not protected by the fear of forensic identification of the source of any WMD attack on the American homeland the way we are protected by that fear on the part of any state sponsor of nuclear terrorism on U.S., soil (Cirincione, 2007).

According to the most credible analysts in the field, the real threat to the U.S.

A posed by a nuclear Iran comes from the prospect of fissionable weapons-grade Uranium or (eventually) Plutonium produced in Iranian facilities transferred to the hands of terrorists like Osama bin Laden, et al. Once that occurs, the likelihood of a nuclear detonation on U.S. soil becomes a virtual certainty; already, renowned experts like Graham Allison (2004) consider this a matter of when not if. Ironically, given the complexities of the primary military threats of the Cold War, the U.S. now faces much greater risk of a devastating nuclear attack detonated in a U-Haul trailer crossing a Manhattan bridge, or one spanning the Potomac than one employing high-tech missile guidance systems launched by another global power (Allison, 2004).

Options for Addressing the Threat of a Nuclear Iran:

There is virtually no doubt that were the U.S. located within the range of Iranian missile technology, we would be as committed against allowing Iran to pursue its nuclear ambitions. In all likelihood, Israel's vulnerability in this regard is such that they will have no choice but to lead an attack designed to destroy the main nuclear facilities in the Iranian program whether or not the U.S. participates, sanctions, or provides direct assistance for such an attack.

However, unlike the Iraqi nuclear reactor destroyed by Israel in Natanz, the Iranian nuclear network comprise hundreds of individual facilities located underground in hardened bunkers and spread out throughout much of the country. It is, therefore, possible that without U.S. tactical assistance, Israel might eventually have only one option for preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons: namely, a pre-emptive nuclear strike of its own. Given the inevitable blame that the U.S. will share throughout the rest of the Muslim world for such an attack, even without direct U.S. involvement, it might behoove this country to provide assistance to enable Israel to destroy the threat using the latest U.S. conventional (i.e. non-nuclear) technology capable of achieving the objective without the unavoidable death of millions in Iran.

However in all likelihood, the geopolitical effect on the U.S. would be comparable either way, except that without U.S. assistance, there is substantially greater chances that enough Iranian facilities would survive an attack by Israel alone, and that Iranian and Muslim sentiments in general would, in the aftermath of any Israeli attack, only increase the commitment of Islamic radicals to attack the U.S. subsequently.