Consequently, the peace talks reached a stalemate.
The international community became more actively involved in the negotiations underway in Sudan. In this sense, the involvement of the U.S. is most relevant. The Clinton Administration in particular imposed economic and political sanctions on the regime in Khartoum given the fact that it was the Sudanese state that constantly refused to accept negotiations with its counterparts. Countries in the region as well got involved in the process and supported the ongoing talks through the Intergovernmental Authority for Development. This structure included states such as Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, and Kenya. Nonetheless, there were large disagreements over the drawing up of the actual meaning of the notion of self-determination, of the duration of the period until a referendum could be set up, or even over the delimitation of South Sudan. (Drumtra, 1998)
Peace talks resumed at the highest level through the Machakos Protocol in 2002. Agreed upon by the Sudanese government on the one hand and the SPLM/a on the other, the document stated the cultural and social identity of the South of Sudan, as well as its right to self-determination. Also, a pre-interim period of six months would be enacted to ensure the creation of institutions that would support a cease fire as well as the proper representation of all the forces involved in the conflict. Following this period, an interim period of six years would allow authorities to consider whether a united Sudan or a secessionist South would be the solution for reaching a peaceful end to the conflict. (Machakos Protocol, 2002) in relation to the law that would govern Sudan, this would be the Shari an except for the region of the South which "shall have as its source of legislation popular consensus, the values and the customs of the people of Sudan including their traditions and religious beliefs, having regard to Sudan's diversity." (Machakos protocol, 2002) Indeed, these were important steps taken in the direction of peace, but, at the same time, the most difficult task was the actual implementation and respect of these provisions.
The pressure of the international community as well as the sanctions imposed by all major factors such as the U.S. under the Bush Administration and the European Union forced the Khartoum regime to negotiate further agreements on specific matters that represented sensitive issues in Sudan. In this sense, in 2004 the Agreement on Wealth Sharing and the Protocol on Power Sharing were signed.
The Agreement on Wealth Sharing and the Protocol on Power Sharing touched upon a serious aspect affecting the Sudanese society. There are great disparities between different regions of the country and the political system is designed in such a manner as to enable central control over the resource revenues and their appropriation. In this sense, many feared that a decentralization of the power, especially concerning the Southern part of the country, would weaken the tries made towards an equal development of all regions. Moreover, once Sudan became an oil exporting country, there was the matter of distributing the revenues coming from that trade. In this sense, "wealth-sharing is closely linked to concerns with power-sharing or the division of powers between the central and southern administrations, and is also linked to economic rehabilitation and reconstruction for the entire country, but in particular for the south." (IRIN, 2007) Hence, it was decided that the needs of the respective region would determine the allocation of the funds needed to ensure an equal development of the country. Thus, there would be no discrimination based on "gender, race, religion, political affiliation, ethnicity, language, or region." (Agreement on Wealth Sharing, 2004) These provisions were decided upon in connection with the Power Sharing Protocol, which recognized the decentralization of power in regard to Southern Sudan thus following the guiding principles of the Machakos Protocol.
The actions undergone since 2002 are indeed essential for the eventual resolution of the conflict. Even if there were agreed upon political statements and agreements, the turning point in following the peace process represented the increased political will of all the parties involved to reach a sustainable solution. However, a major part was played by the international community which pressed forward the talks and encouraged discussions between the parties. In this sense, the UN Mission in Sudan established in June 2004 proved an important incentive. Its mandate, as presented...
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