TSA
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, when members of al-Qaeda hijacked passenger planes and flew them into various targets in the United States, the Transportation Security Administration has aggressively expanded its surveillance and security operation, to the chagrin of privacy activists and much of the general public. This expanded surveillance has taken the form of a more aggressive No-Fly list, new scanners, and an increased use of full-body pat-downs. Although as of yet no lawsuit has successfully challenged the TSA's expanded surveillance powers, the fact remains that these powers appear to violate reasonable standards of personal privacy, if not personal privacy laws themselves. When examining the variety of procedures and devices put in place following the attacks of September 11th (and others), passenger claims of inappropriate searches, and the legislation behind some of these expanded powers, it becomes clear that the TSA has likely violated individuals' privacy rights already, and furthermore, that this issue will likely not be settled until the TSA's authority is brought before the Supreme Court.
In the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks, the TSA was roundly criticized for what was perceived as lax security measures, including the fact that the terrorists were able to bring box cutters onto planes, and that some of them had previously been flagged as potential threats. The TSA response to this criticism is worth noting, because it is indicative of its response to subsequent threats, which is mainly to introduce an additional element of security theater meant to specifically target whatever the latest threat was, regardless of the new rules' ability to enhance security. Thus, following September 11th, the TSA banned all blades. Later that year, when Richard Reid attempted to detonate a bomb built into his shoe, the TSA responded by forcing passengers to remove their shoes before screening. In 2006, when British investigators discovered a plot to use liquid explosives to detonate planes, the TSA responded by banning more than three ounces of any liquid in carry-on luggage (with certain medical exceptions) (Johnstone, 2007, p. 51). Finally, when Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to detonate a bomb hidden in his underwear, the TSA opted to begin installation of full-body scanners. Individuals who object to the full-body scans are subjected to "enhanced pat-downs and extremely invasive manual checks" (Democracy Now, 2012).
Of these responses, only the removal of shoes and full-body scans could truly be said to violate privacy, because although the banning of certain objects and substances may present a hassle for passengers, one cannot reasonably consider these steps a violation of privacy (although one can of course challenge them on the basis of their effectiveness or utility). Furthermore, while removing shoes is an impingement on privacy in that the individual has to remove a portion of his or her clothing, for the most part feet are not considered a "private" part of the body and thus the invasion is minimal at best. However, the introduction of full-body scanners is extremely problematic, not only because the machines are able to image a person's naked body, but because of the procedures surrounding their testing, deployment, and use.
Even before the privacy concerns, the TSA's use of full body scanners is problematic because the machines were deployed prior to a robust investigation into their relative safety in terms of radiation exposure. Although the TSA has provided journalists and investigators with studies lauding the machines' safety, according to the head of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, which is suing the TSA over its use of the machines, "every time the TSA is pressed [on health risk concerns], they always point to studies that they have arranged with other federal agencies, [refusing] to allow independent experts to make their own investigations" (Democracy Now, 2012). Thus, even independent of any privacy concerns, the use of full-body scanners represents a potentially dangerous overreach on the part of the TSA.
Furthermore, the effectiveness of the scanning machines has been questioned due to the way they image individuals. In short, the images present the person as a light figure on a dark background, with any hidden objects appearing black atop the image of the figure. However, because the background is black and the objects appear black, investigators have been able to hide objects from the machines simply by placing them at their side, where the black object disappears into the black background (Democracy Now, 2012). In other words, simply by placing the hidden object at the side...
This category can further be divided into six subgroups namely; short-range, medium range, long-range, close range, endurance, Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). The long-range UAVs are technologically more advanced as they use satellites in order to overcome the communication problem between the UAVs and the ground stations. This communication problem is generally caused by the curvature of the earth. The medium, short and close range
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