" Morse makes the compelling argument that the President has no Constitutional power to act in this fashion and should not be granted a resolution to that effect, which effectively sidesteps the Constitution and its checks and balances system. Interestingly, supporters of the resolution seemed unfazed by this realization. Senator Cooper's back-and-forth with Senators Russell and Fulbright demonstrates this. He continued to probe the nature of the powers the resolution would grant, ultimately articulating that it amounted to approving of the President's current actions and supporting any future ones the President determines to be necessary. Senator Cooper asked, "Then, looking ahead, if the President decided that it was necessary to use such force as could lead into war, we will give him that authority by this resolution?" The supporters agree that this is the case, upon which Cooper points out it is important...

The ideological fear of communism, as well as the presumably unprovoked attacks on U.S. military forces, facilitated a political climate that undermined the Constitution and concentrated undue power within the hands of the President, all with the shaky promise that Congress could revoke the Resolution at a later date should it wish.
Works Cited

US Senate Debate on the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. 5 Aug. 1964. If additional citation information is available, it should be included here.