Cousins issued right rudder commands to result in the desired course change and took the ship off autopilot. While such efforts did not result in turning swiftly Cousins ordered further right rudder with increasing urgency. The bumpy ride and six very sharp jolts occurred at 12:04 AM. The vessel grounded towards southwest balanced across its middle on a pinnacle of Bligh Reef. Eight of the eleven oil tanks punctured flooding about 5.8 million gallons out of the tanker in the first three and quarter hours. The confessions at NTSB indicated that Cousins may have been awake and normally at work for up to 18 hours preceding the accident. There is the evidence of direct impact of fatigue on human performance error and recognized that about 80% or more of marine accidents are attributable to human error. (Details about the Accident)
The circumstantial factors like prolonged duty hours, poor working conditions, monotony and sleep deprivation can give rise to a scenario where a pilot and/or crew members may become the susceptible to the occurrence of an accident. Besides the personnel policies may also have influenced the crew fatigue. A comparative figure indicated by Arthur McKenzie of the Tanker Advisory Center in New York revealed that the tankers during 1950 required a crew of about 40 to 42 to deal with only 6.3 million gallons of oil while in Exxon Valdez could rely with a crew of 19 to transport 53 million gallons of oil. The U.S. Coast Guard sets the limits for minimum vessel manning however, without any agency wide standard for policy. While Exxon could protect their actions on economic policies the report indicates that severe criticism are leveled against them for manipulating overtime records to better justify reduced manning levels.
Larossi and Exxon could defend that the modern automated vessel technology allowed the reduced manning without any cost in terms of safety or functions. However, the literature indicated that automation cannot substitute humans in the systems instead it places the human in a different, more demanding role. Automation particularly declines the manual workload but enhances the mental workload. The NTSB and Courts finally concluded the work hours of the Cousins and the limitations of the crew personnel. The Oil Spill Commission of Alaska suggests that crew levels be set high sufficiently not only to allow safe operations during ordinary conditions in the Gulf of Alaska can be highly demanding but also to generate sufficient crew backups and rest periods that crisis situations can be dealt by a new and well supported personnel. (Details about the Accident)
The immediate response to deal with the spreading sea of oil was a challenge to the capabilities of the Alyeska Pipeline Service Company and the reports revealed that it was unexpectedly slow and woefully insufficient. The global capabilities of Exxon Corp would mobilize huge quantities of equipment and personnel to attend to the spill but its efforts were not adequate during first few hours and days when containment and cleanup efforts are in full swing. The U.S. Coast Guard could indicate its prowess at ship salvage, safeguarding the crews and lightering operations, however, proved utterly incapable of oil spill containment and response. The state and federal authorities demonstrated differing levels of preparedness and command capability. The Waters of Prince William Sound and gradually about more than 1000 miles of beach in South Central Alaska would be fouled by 10.8 million gallons of crude oil. (Details about the Accident)
John Keeble narrated the story in 'Out of the Channel: the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill in Prince William Sound' particularly the concentrating on the way the Exxon dealt the public relations aspect of the disaster and a critique of the way Exxon handled the public relations dimension of the incident. The way Exxon Company dealt with the spill was regarded as more tragic. The major task of the Company at the time was to attempt cleaning operations in the area and generate goodwill among the residents of the area. It was strangled not only with physical cleanup but also attempted to have a spiritual cleanup. However, the...
Rawl confessed that it was "bad judgement involved in even putting a person with a critical skill back in that kind of work...It is pretty clear we have to tighten those things up" (Loeb pp). When asked what advice he had for other CEOs, Rawl stated that they had better prethink which way they are going to jump from a public affairs standpoint before they have any kind of a
It remains uncertain, therefore, that the Exxon Valdez spill was not, in fact, larger in scale and scope than the Horizon disaster. Conclusion: The Horizon disaster, as it bears noting, helps to demonstrate how little has truly changed in two decades. Even as environmental concerns grow ever-more pressing, oil companies continue to act with relative impunity. The sheer profitability of the industry keeps it insulated from many of the safety and
The workforce should be clear about the implementation of technologies for protecting natural resources, through formulating strategies. Ratification of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) 1984 Protocols Domestic legislation on compensation and liability is needed to implement two IMO protocols related to compensation and liability. The United States should ratify the 1984 Protocols to the 1969 Civil Liability and the 1971 Fund Conventions. Expeditious ratification is essential to ensure international agreement on
Like most litigations on such complicated issues the company had little to do but show reasonable accommodation, adopt better surface practices and wait out a lengthy period before their liability was reduced substantially by the courts. Ethical analysis: The key ethical issues of the case are pretty clear, did the captain knowingly endanger the environment by continuing to retain his position and navigate tankers through the area and did the company
Instead, he believed from the charts he had studied that it would be possible to steer safely through the sharp rocks of the reef, shortening the time and distance of the trip (Streissguth & Chandler, 2003). Just after midnight, the ship struck the reef, and the disaster began. Soon thereafter, accusations began flying. Hazelwood had a history of drunk driving (of his car), and admitted to having several drinks
Fluctuations in any natural ecosystem have the potential to wreak havoc on the environment and animal populations as a whole. The impact of environmental oil spills has been studied for decades, thus there is a certain predictive quality regarding the events that will occur immediately after an oil spill. One might assume that if the nature of oil spills and recovery efforts are predictive, than adequate measures can be taken
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