Engineering Ethics
This post-mortem report is directed to the British Petroleum (BP) board of directors concerning the BP Texas City refinery explosion incident that took place on March 23, 2005. A series of explosions occurred during the restarting of the hydrocarbon isomerization unit in the Texas City refinery. The main technical reason behind the initial explosion was the flooding of the over-pressurized distillation column, which ended up in a geyser of combustible vapor release in the vent stack. A car engine near the tower then ignited the vapor, causing ghastly explosions that resulted in 15 deaths and 170 injuries. This post-mortem report is especially relevant given that the very same Texas City refinery had a fire on October 30, 2012 at its Resid Hyrdotreating Unit. The fire was extinguished with no major injury or damage occurring, but it was officially rated as a Level 2 emergency within the refinery and for the city. A Level 2 designation suggests "it was not having an effect on the community but it had the potential to," (Pulsinelli, 2012). The Texas City situation reveals some deeper ethical issues that need to be addressed by the company.
This post-mortem report is also timely because as of November 15, 2012, BP settled with the United States Department of Justice on both civil and criminal charges related to the 2010 Deepwater Horizon explosion incident. In the past several years, BP has had many other work incidents that call attention to what can be called a deplorable, nearly comedic, safety record. It is believed that the safety hazards like the 2005 Texas City disaster are caused by BP's inability to implement a code of ethics. In particular, BP has made disastrous decisions to put profit ahead of social, environmental, and moral responsibility.
By only concentrating on money, BP failed to apply a simple utilitarianism ethical framework where a right decision is made according to one basic principle, which is: to what causes the greatest good for the greatest number of beings. Therefore, the recommended action for BP is to apply a new process of safety regulation. Using this new safety regulation process, workers can report any work hazards they observe without fear of retaliation, reprimand, or ridicule. With a procedural solution like the one suggested, BP will be taking an important first step toward making decisions in accordance with utilitarian ethics.
Description of Engineering Failure
On the morning of March 23, 2005, BP employees and contract workers at the Texas City Refinery "began an especially dangerous procedure: re-starting a unit that had been down for repairs," (Schorn, 2009). As part of the repair procedure, the workers began filling an isomerization unit tower with gasoline but an overflow alarm failed to trigger. Compounding the failure of the alarm was yet another problem: the shift changed and a new operator was unaware of the state of the isomerization unit. The former operator had failed to keep a detailed record of events in the logbook.
Moreover, a senior supervisor had come late, and left early. The new operator kept the feed running, and had no experienced personnel with him for guidance. When the problem with the alarm was detected, it was too late. As a result, the distillation column overflowed with liquid gasoline. It flowed to the vent stack, where it released itself in a geyser of fumes and liquid that was visible from afar. What happened next is not surprising. "The plume of gas had formed a massive vapor cloud on the ground, and an idling truck likely had ignited the fumes," (Schorn, 2009, p. 1). The resulting explosion had devastating consequences.
For one, BP had allowed the construction of trailers for overflow workers to be built close to the isomerization unit. As Schorn (2009) points out, "the blast pulverized several office trailers full of workers parked nearby," (p. 1)
Analysis of ethical lapses
The ethical lapses are relatively clear in hindsight, and there are several specifics. First, BP ignored the poor safety standards and conditions at the Texas City refinery. Reports released after the event reveal the extent to which BP knew about the poor safety standards at the Texas City refinery and did nothing about it. For one, equipment was known to be sorely outdated and dangerous. "Unsafe and antiquated equipment designs were left in place, and unacceptable deficiencies in preventative maintenance were tolerated," ("CSB Investigation of BP Texas City Refinery Disaster Continues as Organizational Issues Are Probed" 2006). Schorn (2009) notes, "investigators found problems at Texas City just about everywhere they looked: antiquated equipment,...
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