World War II -- Eastern Front
While the personality of any dictator may significantly influence the military decisions of his/her dictatorship, perhaps the clearest instance of this phenomenon occurred in World War II's Barbarossa, an invasion of Russia in the Eastern Front. Obsessed with his messianic delusions, Hitler's personal flaws resulted in the ultimate failure of the greatest invasion in recorded history. The failure of that invasion, in turn, directly resulted in Germany's loss of World War II.
Hitler's Personal Flaws Caused the Failure of Barbarossa
Synthesis of reputable historical sources, some of which stress Adolf Hitler's personal flaws while others minimize or ignore them, reveals that Adolf Hitler's personal shortcomings caused the failure of Barbarossa and, therefore, caused Germany's loss of World War II. Hitler's warlike personality was apparently dominated by "the three p's": prejudice, paranoia, and perplexity. Though Hitler was famously prejudiced against Jewish people, his prejudice against all non-Aryan people, including the people of Russia, was equally intense and costly. This deep-seeded prejudice is perhaps best described by Richard Overy, who asserts that when wedded with his messianic complex, Hitler's "savage prejudices" made him an explosive force in world politics[footnoteRef:1], in this case reflecting a nearly mythic contest between Slavs and Germans for the 7 prior centuries.[footnoteRef:2] Matthew Cooper shares Overy's vision, believing that Hitler was confident of victory due to the qualitatively inferior enemy.[footnoteRef:3] Though minimizing its effect, Gerhard Weinberg touches on the effects of this longstanding prejudice, stating that that Hitler and his army deemed non-Aryans Untermenschen, or subhuman[footnoteRef:4] and John Keegan speaks of the resulting policy whereby Germans oppressed and exploited "inferior" people.[footnoteRef:5] Unfortunately, though focusing on the doctrine and training of the German Army, Robert Citino essentially ignores the importance of this prejudice in formulating German policy toward all non-Aryan races, including the Russian people. As a result of this prejudice and underestimation of the people of Russia to endure and eventually beat back the Germans, Hitler seriously miscalculated the ultimate effectiveness of Barbarossa. [1: Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (New York, NY W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1997), 10.] [2: Ibid., 219] [3: Matthew Cooper, The German Army, 1933-1945: Its Political and Military Failure (New York, NY: Stein and Day, 1978), 215.] [4: Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 756.] [5: John Keegan, The Battle for History: Re-Fighting World War II (New York, NY: First Vintage Books Edition, 1996), 115.]
Hitler's paranoia also apparently significantly contributed to the failure of Barbarossa. Cooper speaks extensively of Hitler's inherent distrust of his own generals. As Citino states, a well-trained German military leader understood through training that victory depended not only on his own army's intentions but also on the terrain and enemy's attitude.[footnoteRef:6] Knowing these factors through the benefit of training, Hitler's generals warned him of the probably failure of Barbarossa; however, Hitler refused to listen due to his distrust of his own generals. Though the most notable instance of distrust is focused on Heinz Guderian[footnoteRef:7], who was led Hitler's 2nd Panzer Group taking part in Barbarossa, Cooper points out that Hitler's distrust of his generals shocked and dismayed them[footnoteRef:8], and that distrust grew in the course of Barbarossa.[footnoteRef:9] Weinberg also speaks of Hitler's distrust of his military leadership[footnoteRef:10], a crippling doubt that grew with each defeat.[footnoteRef:11] However, Citino, Keegan and Overy do not mention the paranoia/distrust that compelled Hitler to formulate his plans and ignore the warnings of his own generals. [6: Citino, 50.] [7: Cooper, 530.] [8: Ibid., 189.] [9: Ibid., 444.] [10: Weinberg, 686.] [11: Ibid., 454.]
Finally, though Hitler's forces enjoyed several significant early victories[footnoteRef:12], ultimately suffered defeat due to Hitler's perplexity as to which way his forces should be directed once they were in Russia. After his initial easy victories during Barbarossa, Hitler was...
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