(e) MacArthur was a control freak and he hated the press; to the suggestion that he was implementing a socialist economy in Japan, he was outraged (Buhite, 2008).
(f) When reporters did not write what he wanted while he was in Japan, he had them thrown out and not allowed back in; any negative reporting might hurt his chances to win the Republican nomination for the presidency (Buhite, 2008).
Thesis THREE: MacArthur, now in charge of the American & UN forces in Korea, showed his militant independence as to how to conduct the war, and presented some outrageously controversial plans as to how to win the war along with alienating American allies.
i) the Joint Chiefs of Staff demanded that MacArthur avoid attacking the Yalu bridges because he would have to fly over Manchurian territory and though MacArthur's airmen tried heroically to isolate Korea" the way islands were isolated in WWII, it wasn't to be done, but MacArthur had a more bizarre strategy for Manchuria and China in any event (Weigley, 1977).
ii) MacArthur wanted to expand the war into China; he wanted to strategically bomb Manchurian production centers and Chinese airfields and send ground troops into China, a provocative and strategically risky proposal (Jackson, 2010).
iii) MacArthur "mistreated the British political representative" in Japan, and "clashed regularly with British press correspondents"; his "strategic views, independence, and aggressive machinations frightened and infuriated the British" (Belmonte, 1995).
iv) MacArthur managed to shatter plans that the Allies had for an early armistice to the war by issuing an "ultimatum that not only challenged...
His ultimatum: the Chinese should simply surrender now because the UN and American forces can come into China and destroy them. He was speaking only for himself, of course, but it was embarrassing and caused an enormous rift between the U.S. And Britain (Belmonte, 1995).
v) President Truman had moved several nuclear weapons to Guam and Okinawa (unbeknownst to MacArthur) but MacArthur was so out of control that members of the Truman administration "were terrified at the prospect of MacArthur mounting an unauthorized nuclear strike" on Manchuria or China (Belmonte, 1995).
Works Cited
Belmonte, Laura. (1995). Anglo-American Relations and the Dismissal of MacArthur.
Diplomatic History, 19(4), 641-667.
Buhite, Russell D. (2008). Douglas MacArthur, Statecraft and Stagecraft in America's
East Asian Policy. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Jackson, Colin F. (2010). Los Chance or Lost Horizon? Strategic Opportunity and Escalation Risk in the Korean War, April-July 1951. The Journal of Strategic
Studies, 33(2), 255-289.
Pearlman, Michael D. (2008). Why Did Truman Fire MacArthur? (and Why Did He
Wait So Long to Do it?) History News Network. Retrieved February 8, 2012, from http://hnn.us/articles/48797.html.
Wainstock, Dennis. (1999). Truman, MacArthur, and the Korean War. Santa Barbara,
CA: Greenwood Publishing Group.
Weigley, Russell Frank. (1977). The American Way of War: A History of the United
States Military Strategy and Policy. Bloomington, in: Indiana University Press.
