¶ … Joplin Tornado Disaster The Category EF-5 tornado that struck Joplin, Missouri, in 2011 devastated the region, killing 161 people and injuring over a thousand more (Smith, Sutter, 2013). In all, local, state and federal agencies and officials worked together to ensure a better response to the disaster, when compared to the debacle that was the response to Katrina; what was most notable about the disaster recovery in Joplin was that officials allowed the private sector "to lead the response and recovery (Smith, Sutter, 2013, p. 166). In other words, authorities from government agencies took a hands-off approach to the disaster response in Joplin and allowed non-profits and private organizations do the majority of the work. Volunteers took part in providing shelters and faith-based organizations rallied around the community to assist in the various needs using social media to help put out notices, organize and identify strategic aims; local organizations, churches provided thousands of temporary shelters for homeless while FEMA provided 600, for example (Smith, Sutter, 2013, p. 171). In total, volunteer efforts saved the city more than $17 million (Joplin Proud, 2016, p. 20). This paper will discuss the Disaster Recovery response in Joplin and show how and why it was effective in its various aspects.

The coordinated response by government officials resulted in Governor Nixon declaring a state of emergency and bringing in the Missouri National Guard. Missouri Task Force One (unit of 85 members plus equipment and four dogs) and embarked on the search for missing persons. Included in the search were five rescue teams as well as a number of other agencies and volunteers. The National Guard brought nearly 200 individuals with another 2000 in back-up, and the Missouri State Highway added an additional 200 troopers to work with the Joplin PD. Ambulance strike teams and 75 marines from Ft. Leonard were also deployed to assist in the Recovery operation (After the Storm, 2012, p. 7). Thus, the authorities in Joplin handled the recovery, identification and safeguarding of human remains in the most adequate way they could, employing the help of various agencies to assist in the search for missing persons and to oversee the process of caring for human remains. The cooperation among the task forces was supported by local community groups and volunteers who organized to help support the overall recovery process and who were given freedom to lead major directives to help restore the city in the wake of the disaster.

The recovery response was largely led by private and non-profit groups (the Red Cross was instrumental in assisting with shelters and other needs), and so operational and tactical plans involving the erection of shelters, the providing of sustenance and basic needs for displaced persons as well as for helping in the recovery aims of rebuilding and looking for survivors was organized at a grassroots level with government officials allowing and encouraging a grassroots community response of faith-based organizations, private sector organizations and non-profits (Smith, Sutter, 2013; After the Storm, 2012). The community response to the disaster was formulated mainly in the wake, with organizing taking place in various sectors and communications going through leadership positions that were erected to oversee the response. However, at the same time, aid from government agencies was forthcoming and prompt, with Gov. Nixon leading the way in the call for the National Guard and working with the Missouri Division of Fire Safety, EMS and search and rescue teams in these departments. The state's Incident Support Team (IST) program also took part in providing "experienced command-level emergency response agency leaders" to the community for the purpose of leading the drive and helping with the overall organization; thus, to this degree, with the IST in place, a plan was already developed for providing the management infrastructure in terms of coordination and communication among the various organizations, with the IST leading the way (After the Storm, 2012, p. 9).

In the wake of the disaster, impacted businesses and organizations were able to find immediate relief from the intervention of insurance agencies, "who had representatives on the ground immediately and were writing advance checks to provide for disaster victims' immediate needs" (Smith, Suttter, 2013, p. 173). Following this intervention, adjustors arrived to assess damage and be involved in the rebuilding process. Likewise, donations from for-profit firms like Home Depot contributed millions to charitable organizations like the American Red Cross and the Joplin Recovery Fund (Smith, Sutter, 2013, p. 174). Efforts of rebuilding were administered by the Joplin Chamber of Commerce which "coordinated peer-to-peer assistance between businesses, which shared space, expertise, services and goods" (Smith, Sutter, 2013, p. 175). The voluntary sector contributed significantly to coordinating efforts to ensure rebuilding, as continuity plans were not evident, though continuity issues did not arise as the various sectors of the community rallied together to...

For this reason, business and organization recovery in Joplin has been exceedingly successful.
The recovery efforts of St. John's Regional Medical Center in Joplin, however, were a combination of inadequate security and an overwhelming influx of intruders (workers looking for personal items, media attempting to get too close to building) and large scale debris (250 cars piled atop one another and against the hospital, which had all doors and windows blown out), which required heavy equipment for removing (Bollin, 2011).

The initial phase of St. John's recovery effort was to establish a perimeter and security force. The hospital had to wait for adequate security staff to arrive and had to wait on command centers to be delivered as well. Thus, securing the area was the first objective, which was an essential first step. However, security presence was not as immediately forthcoming as was needed, and the Mercy system did not respond with incredible speed. Nonetheless, security forces gradually began to arrive, with a proper gate around the facility erected after two-weeks time (Bollin, 2011). Two-weeks to erect a gate was not the fastest time that it could have erected; however, considering the scope of the disaster and the fact that patients and workers had all been transferred, this was as adequate as could be expected. Traffic control was also an issue that was resolved gradually, but the insufficiency of initial security was the main problem at the outset and Mercy could have done more to fix this (Bollin, 2011). Once heavy equipment arrived, vehicles were checked for dead before removing, but providing security for owners of cars and insurance agents was another problem. Securing hazardous materials was also problematic and involved coordinated efforts, with the help of Resource Optimization and Innovation (ROI), part of Mercy's system supply division (Bollin, 2011). ROI had prepared a disaster plan months earlier so was ready for action (Bollin, 2011).

The next phase of the process was to engage in short-term hospital planning. Senior leadership in the Mercy system wanted the hospital up and running again, so plans were made to move this project along; meanwhile, a field hospital used during Desert Storm was erected by the National Guard. Mobile services were implemented, including surgery suite, pharmacy, lab and nutrition center (Bollin, 2011). Support from ROI remained critical and without it the hospital would have remained a disaster zone for much longer. Construction crews worked to establish new parking lots; electricity, water and sanitation lines were all completed and operational within days (Bollin, 2011). Thus in terms of short-term planning, the hospital performed well thanks to ROI's preparation plan.

The final stage was property recovery. As the hospital had been damaged, with walls collapsing, and equipment strewn everywhere, there was a great need for clean-up and rebuilding. Safety assessments had to be made before recovery could commence, and debris had to be removed. Structurally unsound buildings were identified and hazardous wastes removed. After a few days entry into buildings was permitted and more in-depth analysis of structure showed that they could begin proper clean-up. Environmental Recovery arrived by week's end to assist in clean-up. The key-take away from this recovery was that communication is the most vital aspect of the process with security being next (Bollin, 2011).

I believe my community could recover from such a disaster so long as it employed the same kind of grassroots response working in conjunction with officials and agencies trained and prepared to handle recovery processes. Planning ahead of time like ROI is a must and having a sense of spirit of mission within the community is also imperative as it cuts down on accidents, crime, confusion, and chaos. Joplin showed how a good community responds, and I would like to think that my community would pitch in to make the same effort. With some coordination, communication and volunteers, our community could respond to such a disaster.

References

After the Storm. (2012). Missouri's Commitment to Joplin. Retrieved from http://sema.dps.mo.gov/newspubs/publications/AfterTheStormMissouriCommitmentToJoplin.pdf

Bollin, S. (2011). The Day After: Recovery Efforts at St. John's Mercy Joplin.

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Joplin Proud. (2016). Joplin Disaster Recovery Summit. Retrieved from http://www.joplinproud.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/JoplinProud-SummitProgram-8.5x11-WEB.pdf

Smith, D., Sutter, D. (2013). Response and Recovery after the Joplin Tornado: Lessons

Applied and Lessons Learned. Independent Review, 18(2):…