Commission Report
There's a substantial gap between the notions presented by the 9/11 Commission on inadequate imagination and its suggested solutions. It's unlikely that the primary modifications can help create analytical solutions in a limited amount of time. The advancement of national intelligence centres is really a pricey solution and idea that rests on impractical belief in the impartiality and just approach of the policymakers. The requirement of a bigger and much more diverse community of experts may, perversely, lower the standard of their work. And there's really no point in anticipating that the DCI could be more in a position to encourage imagination when he's no longer the principal intelligence consultant (Rovner and Long, 2005).
More realistic and logical plans within the Commission report are directly and indirectly proportional to the imagination problem; included in this are growing the FBI's intelligence abilities and mandating standardized DOD and DHS risk checks. These plans have to be structured around the existing assets and really should offer some form of advantage in the long run. One of the more sensible recommendations was to declassify the overall intelligence budget. This not only made sense in the long run but was also highly relevant to eradicating the loopholes in the system that led to failure. Ironically, it was the one recommendation that the Congress rejected (Rovner and Long, 2005). In this paper we will discuss some of the reasons that led to and have thus influenced the security protocols in the United States in light of the Commission Report of 9/11.
Overview
The 9/11 Commission Report continues to be distinctively influential within the debate concerning the organization of intelligence within the United States. A lot of its recommendations were integrated into the lately passed legislation which will enact probably the most prominent and expansive changes towards the intelligence community in the past 6 decades. Within this section of the paper, we analyze the ideas of intelligence failure presented through the Commission Report, and examine how carefully the suggested reforms are associated with individualistic and standardized ideas. There are two primary logics that we present: first, the ideas of failure have not been examined in detail and can be said to be underdeveloped; second, the suggested reforms are mainly unrelated towards the hypothesized reasons for failure. Therefore, the big business reforms presently underway are implausible to enhance intelligence performance considerably (White, 2004).
The 9/11 Commission discovered that the intelligence community had to basically endure deficiencies within the institutional imagination prior to the September 11 attacks. This was the reason why it became impossible for many experts and decision-makers to determine the terrorist threat in a precisely and timely manner. Had they better gauged and realized the risk of attacks from al Qaeda, they might have been able to take steps to enhance warning intelligence. More imagination may also have assisted experts analyze and identify the important network of terrorists that designed, organized and performed the breaches and attacks on 9/11. Quite simply, the intelligence community was unable to "connect the dots," because it wasn't adequately imaginative (White, 2004).
Finally, based on the conclusions of the Commission Report, it is safe to say that the higher the level of imagination, the higher would be the stimulated and aggressive counter-terror guideline. This would also result in a much more vigilant and efficient homeland security system. The uncertainty of designs and structures to fight against the terrorist networks on a national and global scale throughout the Clinton and Bush administrations indicates the threat never was fully understood. When it comes to homeland security, there is a more expansive distribution of CIA risk assessments confirming that terrorist agents might have introduced a lot more focus on the requirement for permanent alterations in domestic airport terminal and air travel security methods than ever needed before (Whitney and Trosten-Bloom, 2003).
Even though some agencies were worried about a potential hijacking incident before September 11, they didn't embark on the use of standard methods developed through the years to protect against an unexpected attack. Particularly, they didn't evaluate how terrorists would use a plane like a weapon, or describe the obvious indications that could have possibly highlighted the design behind this kind of a terrorist operation. The intelligence community didn't deem it important to, for example, assign analytical teams to act as terrorists. These "red teams" may have stimulated creativity and notified the city towards the features of and destruction from the threat (Whitney and Trosten-Bloom, 2003).
Remarkably, the Commission Report didn't clearly connect some of its plans for this theory of failure. Regardless of the focus on imagination within the Commission's rationalization of everything that...
For example, the report presents comprehensive aspects about how exactly the intelligence community didn't completely understand the indicators, despite the fact that there were alarming breaches and indicators throughout the 2001 summer. The Report further explains the numerous skipped possibilities to upset and uproot al Qaeda procedures. The country had vital details and information at its disposal, but it couldn't clearly identify the significance of the information it had. Still, no 9/11 Commission plans offer obvious information on how you can institutionalize security and risk evaluation/imagination. It never signifies which plans may help the intelligence community anticipate risks to national security (Whitney and Trosten-Bloom, 2003).
Five plans, on the other hand, are ultimately associated with the problem.
National Intelligence Centers: The Commission suggested the advance of a broadened National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), in addition to a quantity of more compact problem-specific assessment foundations. This proposal was incorporated in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act released in the year 2004. This act was structured in line with the military's combatant instructions that existed at the time, and helped these "national intelligence centers" to concentrate on specified concerns, topics and regions (U.S. Department of Justice, 2004).
Director of National Intelligence: The 2nd recommendation to enhance imagination pertains to the necessity of a director of national intelligence playing his role in the short and long run. The Commission contended that the structure of DNI allows the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to pay attention to repairing analytic abilities within the CIA framework. The DCI has typically conducted the role of the higher administration for the likes of CIA, the main intelligence consultant towards the commander-in-chief as the time, and also the nominal representative of the intelligence community. By draining the DCI of his counseling and management responsibilities, the Commission came to the conclusion that the director could focus on enhancing CIA analyses (U.S. Department of Justice, 2004).
Declassifying the intelligence budget: the Commission Report further suggested that the intelligence financial investments, currently classified, need to be declassified in order to clearly highlight where and how the finances are being used. It properly argues that there can never really be a knowledgeable and logical public debate over the focal points of success of failure if the general masses are not aware of the percentage and use of the total investing within the intelligence sector as well as the fundamental distribution of funds within the intelligence community. This recommendation is not only logical but its application is also due. Regrettably, Congress didn't incorporate it within the finalized draft of the reform practices that need to be adopted (U.S. Department of Justice, 2004).
FBI intelligence: The Commission Report's fourth suggestion was the creation of a special national security labor force that worked from inside the FBI, as a sister corporation. The Bureau's conventional standard of priorities continues to be criminal justice, that the 9/11 Commission recognizes that it is really a different authority from what national security encompasses. Like a police force agency, its evidentiary requirements are much greater than the intelligence agencies that actually work on an international scale (U.S. Department of Justice, 2004).
Risk checks: Finally, the Commission suggests that the structures like the Departments of Homeland Security and Defense perform frequent risk monitoring checks and assessments. It belittled the performance of the United States Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) purely for disregarding the threat resulting from planes travelling from the domestic runways before the attacks that took place on September 11. It was a typical and unconditional sign of failing an obsolete approach to imagination. The Commission believes that the frequent and thorough DOD risk and threat checks/assessments will do something to prevent tunnel vision in the long run. The DHS risk inspections and assessments are designed to serve an identical purpose, despite the fact that they're targeted mainly toward enhancing the efficiency and toughness for the performance of the first responders. Fortunately, these two plans were integrated into the final draft of the congressional reform bill (U.S. Department of Justice, 2004).
Negligence or Overlooked Aspects
As 2001 started, counterterrorism authorities were receiving regular but incomplete reviews about risks. Indeed, there appeared to be some clear-cut patterns of possible risks just about everywhere within the important cities of the United States (Surowiecki, 2005; Blin, 1968).
To comprehend the way the escalation in threat recognition and recording was tackled in 2001, it's helpful…
