Proposal and Methodology of this Paper will dedicate my paper to the problems with the concept of modularity. First I will give a definition of massive modularity, explain something about domain-specific and domain-general hypotheses, and give Fodor's view of modularity. Then I will show that some domain-specific modules can be found in lower level processing. In the next paragraphs I will outline the theory of (Cosmides and Tooby 1992), which argues that there are also modules dedicated to higher level tasks. Then I will give an overview of Buller's arguments (2005) against specific modules dedicated to higher level processing, and against modularity. Finally, I will argue that the mind isn't strictly modular, but uses domain-general as well as domain-specific processes.
Body and Analysis
Is the mind modular? This question has been hotly debated in psychology and cognitive science. Recently, a group of psychologists, called evolutionary psychologists, have made a remarkable contribution to this discussion. They claim that we can derive from evolutionary theory proof that the mind must be modular. They even go one step further: they claim that the mind must be massively modular. The theory of massive modularity holds that the mind is composed entirely of modules, or tiny computers, that evolved in the human prehistory to selectively process information. The various modules worked...
The differentiated brain circuits set these "domain-specific" modules apart from the hypothesis of "domain-general" intelligence, in which most mental tasks are performed by a single flexible mechanism. The difference between massive modularity and domain-general intelligence is one of mechanism: in the first case, there are different circuits dedicated to different tasks; in the second, there is a single immense circuit that accomplishes a multiplicity of tasks.
The modularity hypothesis of the mind goes back to the 19th century movement called phrenology which claimed that individual mental faculties could be associated precisely with specific physical areas of the brain. Someone's level of intelligence, for example, could be "read" from the size of a particular bump on his posterior parietal lobe. Jerry Fodor, drawing from Chomsky and other evidence from linguistics, revived the idea of the modularity of mind in the 1983 publication of his Modularity of Mind. (Fodor, Jerry 1983)
According to Fodor, a module falls somewhere between the behaviorist and cognitive views of lower level processes. Behaviorists tried to replace the mind with reflexes that are encapsulated and cognitively impenetrable by other cognitive domains. Cognitivists saw lower level processes as continuous with higher level
