Classic Social Psychology Experiments

Social Psychology Studies: Explaining Irrational Individual Behavior by Understanding Group Dynamics

Social psychology is, as its name suggests, a science that blends the fields of psychology, which is the study of the individual, and sociology, which is the study of groups. Social psychology examines how the individual is influenced by the group. It looks at the influence of group or cultural norms on individual behaviors, thoughts, and feelings. However, because group norms are believed to change behavior, social psychology can be very difficult to document; the presence of the observer is believed to change behavior. As a result, social psychologists have developed a number of different studies aimed at investigating the interaction between group expectations and individual behavior. These studies offer insight into human social behavior, particularly into those social behaviors that seem to defy expectations and well-established social norms.

While there have been numerous social psychology studies since the field developed, not all of them have offered the same level of insight into the interaction of the group and the individual. However, ten studies have offered such insight and been so consistent that they have come to be known as classical social psychology studies. These include: The Halo Effect; Cognitive Dissonance; Sherif's Robber's Cave Experiment; The Stanford Prison Experiment; Stanley Milgram's Obedience Experiment; The False Consensus Bias; Social Identity Theory; Bargaining; Bystander Apathy; and Conformity. Though these ten experiments ostensibly examine different aspects of human behavior, when one examines them more closely, one sees that each of them offers insight into one of the most puzzling elements of human behavior: why rational people do seemingly irrational things. Therefore, this paper will examine each of the studies to see how they help explain irrational behavior by the individual by contextualizing it within the group.

The Halo Effect

The Halo Effect refers to the idea that global evaluations about a person impact the judgments about the person's specific traits. A person who looks good is believed to be good, while a person who appears bad is believed to be bad. There is actually a description of three major world leaders during World War II that points out the impact of the Halo Effect; three men are described according to specific characteristics that are seen as either positive or negative such as having mistresses, using drugs or alcohol, and liking dogs. People are always surprised that the candidate with the best specific traits is Hitler, who was a dog-loving, non-drinking, non-smoking vegetarian who did not have any extra-marital affairs, which the two seemingly bad characters are Roosevelt and Churchill. This is due to the Halo Effect, because the global evaluation of Hitler is a negative one, one does not associate him with negative characteristics. Likewise, because Roosevelt and Churchill are generally seen in a positive aspect, one is surprised to find the negative characteristics associated with them. What the Halo Effect means that likability impacts opinions about specific characteristics, and, when researchers have investigated the Halo Effect, people were not even consciously aware that the likeability of a person impacted their judgments about that person.

The Halo Effect can also impact how one interprets characteristics found in a person. For example, "the global evaluation may alter the interpretation of the meaning or evaluation of ambiguous attributes. Thus, if one is told that a warm and friendly person is impetuous, a quite different set of behaviors come to mind from those that occur when one is told that the impetuous person is angry and hostile" (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977, p. 250, para.1). However, judgments about ambiguous stimuli are relatively unimportant when compared to another impact of the Halo Effect, which is the alteration of judgments about unambiguous stimuli, with the person making the judgment unaware of the influence. In many situations, these judgments are harmless. For example, nice people may be seen as more attractive than mean people (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977, p.250, para. 2). This changed perception hardly seems critical. However, when one looks at the backwards global assumption, which is that attractive people are somehow better (nicer, smarter, kinder, more competent) than less attractive people, one can see how the Halo Effect can lead one to make irrational decisions.

Cognitive Dissonance

Cognitive dissonance refers to when two thoughts contradict one another. This is troubling for people, so they close the gap between the two conflicting thoughts. The classic study of cognitive dissonance occurred in the 1950s, when students were asked to describe a boring task as interesting in exchange for a small amount of money, and, then report on their own perception of the task. Those students rated the task as more interesting than students who were paid a greater amount of money to say the task was interesting (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959, p.208, para.2). However, cognitive dissonance does not only refer to situations where a person is aware of conflicting information; it also helps explain why some people seem to be unaware of conflicts between a previously held and a newly held position.

The idea that cognitive dissonance creates movement in one's internal beliefs has a long history of support. As early as the early 1950s, researchers had already determined that, "at least under some conditions, the private opinion changes so as to bring it into closer correspondence with the overt behavior the person was forced to perform. Specifically, they showed that if a person is forced to improvise a speech supporting a point-of-view with which he disagrees, his private opinion moves toward the position advocated in the speech" (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959, p.203, para.1).

What is fascinating about cognitive dissonance, as a theory, is that it underwent so many substantial changes in the 20 years following its introduction that the theory began to focus on things other than dissonance. Instead, the movement to new opinions was believed to be linked to self-esteem and other factors that had nothing to do with conflict in a person's though processes and cognitions. However, Greenwald and Ronis, looking at this history, questioned whether the movement away from the original theory was appropriate. "The continuing process of adjusting a theoretical statement to maintain its currency with empirical data is scientifically questionable. Revision, as opposed to rejection, of a theory is acceptable only so long as basic characteristics of the theory remain intact. In the case of dissonance theory, the emerging centrality of the notion of personal responsibility for undesired consequences does appear to have changed the basic character of the theory" (Greenwald & Ronis, 1978, p.55, para.3). Moreover, they seem to believe that these changes have made cognitive dissonance theory more about ego and self-esteem than about cognitive processes (Greenwald & Ronis, 1978, p.55, para. 3). However, despite changes in the presentation of theory, Greenwald and Ronis make it clear that they do not believe that the original dissonance theory has ever been proven wrong, suggesting support for the old theory, and not the theory which evolved over time.

Sherif's Robber's Cave Experiment

Sherif's Robber's Cave Experiment looks at inter-group conflict and the role of power in those conflicts. In the third of a series of three experiments, two groups of boys were taken to a camp, where the experimenters orchestrated conflict between the boys, and then attempted to see if two groups in conflict could work to find peace. The result of the experiment was that working together to solve a problem helped encourage peace. However, the first two experiments had the boys working together to solve a problem, but then they did so by identifying a common enemy and by ganging up on the experimenters, themselves. Therefore, not only did the experiment reveal information about peace-building, but it also revealed the role that power and the perception of power could play in conflict.

The innovative part of the Robber's Cave experiments was not the finding that groups would develop conflicts. On the contrary, by that time it was already well-understood that even arbitrarily-divided groups would create conflict if the opportunity arose. Instead, the innovative part of the study was that it revealed ways to build consensus and overcome hostility. In fact, "the question- for both theory and policy- is how to overcome this intergroup hostility. Sherif believed that the egocentric orientation of group members could be overcome if the rival groups were involved in achieving superordinate goals- goals that neither group by itself had the resources to achieve" (Fine, 2004, p.664, para. 2). It was not enough that the group achieve a goal together, because, if the goal could have been accomplished without cooperation between the two parties, the accomplishment would not necessarily be linked to one of the groups. Instead, it was important for the goal to be linked to the cooperation, so that the cooperation was essential for success. "The idea that groups sometimes require others for the desired ends is surely accurate and behaviors may alter as a consequence" (Fine, 2004, p.664, para.2). In other words, the groups may still dislike one another, but can still cooperate to achieve a goal.

However, some have questioned whether these results would have been the same if the groups of people had known one another. In the experiment, the boys were not acquainted with one another prior to the experiment. Believing that such a scenario is too artificial to make it generalizable to the population at large, Tyerman and Spencer conducted a similar experiment, but used an existing Scout troop, where the boys knew one another, as the source of the study population (Tyerman & Spencer, 1983, p.519, para.5). Moreover, the divisions in the study were natural divisions. "The subjects had been accustomed to functioning within their four distinct patrol groups at previous camps, meetings and other activities over a long period. At camp, the seven-boy patrol units, although in close proximity, have separate patrol sites in which they cook, eat, and sleep…Again, as in the Sherifs' studies, intergroup competition is very much an institutionalized feature of the scout camp, with, here, daily marks being awarded for efficiency and camping standards, as well as for the organized activities" (Tyerman & Spencer, 1983, p.520, para.3). What they found was that in groups where people knew the members of the out-groups, the hostility level never rose to the levels it did in the groups where the boys were not acquainted prior to the experiments (Tyerman & Spencer, 1983, p. 522, para.2). This suggests that group membership is not defined by membership in a single group, but by overlapping series of group membership.

The Stanford Prison Experiment

Arguably one of the most troubling of all social psychology experiments, the Stanford Prison Experiment helped answer the unanswerable: why those in power abuse those not in power. In this experiment, the researchers divided subjects into two groups: guards and prisoners and set up a simulated prison in a basement at Stanford. Within a day, the prisoners were rebelling against the guards, and the guards were using every bit of power they had to control the prison population. Even the experimenters became engrossed in their roles as prison administrators.

It is important to realize that the experimenters took great steps to arrange as realistic a prison environment as they could. For example, the guards were allowed to select uniforms, which would have them stand out from the prisoners. They were also allowed to set-up rules for how their prison would run; they were given power and authority before ever being introduced to the prisoners. In contrast, the prisoners were deprived of power. "The would-be prisoners were told to wait at home or at the address they provided us, and we would contact them on Sunday" (Zimbardo et al., 2000, p. 6, para.3). However, they were not contacted in a traditional way; instead, the investigators had arranged from them to be arrested by the Palo Alto police department. "After the surprise arrest by the police, they were brought to our simulated prison environment, where they underwent a degradation ceremony as part of the initiation into their new role" (Zimbardo et al., 2000, p. 6, para.3). The prisoners were further dehumanized; their clothes were taken and they were given smocks, forced to wear ankle chains, flip-flops rather than shoes, and could not wear underwear (Zimbardo et al., 2000, p. 6, para.3). Therefore, simply by appearance, this group of college-age boys who had been indistinguishable from one another when selected for their groups could identify as groups through visual cues immediately after the beginning of the study.

The prison guards were prohibited from using physical violence against the inmates, but they tortured them anyway, forcing them to go naked, do pushups, depriving them of sleep, and having them engage in simulated sexual activities with one another (Zimbardo, 2007, p. 2-3). At the time, the experiment was a failure; the prison scenario became so chaotic that another psychologist brought the experiment to a halt after 6 days, rather than allowing it to run for the planned 14 days. However, what it did reveal is that people will adapt to the social roles given to them, in positive and negative ways. Moreover, the study really challenged the prevailing attitudes about the violence in prison conditions at that time, which were based on a dispositional hypothesis that the conditions were the result of violent or sadistic people self-selecting jobs as prison guards and prisoners being a group that already fails to conform to social norms (Haney et al., 1973, p.70-71, para. 3/1).

The other thing it reveals is that even those who understand that they are investigating power and control are not necessarily immune from that impact. In a 2007 article, Philip Zimbardo looked back on the experiment he created, and reflected on the changes it created, not only in the students who were participants, but also in the researchers. He was not even aware of the changes in himself until a fellow professor, whom he was dating, responded in horror when she saw what was occurring in the "prison." According to Zimbardo, "Christina made evident in that one statement that human beings were suffering, not prisoners, not experimental subjects, not paid volunteers. And further, I was the one who was personally responsible for the horrors she had witnessed" (Zimbardo, 2007, p. 3, para.5). As an experimenter, he had insulated himself from the responsibility for the subjects' behavior, because he was not directing them to do any of the behavior. However, as he recognized their sadism, her comments became a mirror for his own willingness to tolerate such behavior.

Stanley Milgram's Obedience Experiment

Competing with the Stanford Prison Experiment for the most insightful look into human darkness is Stanley Milgram's obedience experiment. The experiment itself was basic; have psychology students believe that they are issuing shocks to a fellow student as punishment for failing to answer questions correctly, and see where the students stop following instructions and refuse to administer the shocks. The results defied expectations. Though the participants were not actually administering shocks to the learners in the experiment, they believed they were doing so; the learners engaged in responses to the "shocks" which were audible to the participants. These responses included screams, pleading, and then silence. However, the majority of the participants continued to escalate shock levels. That does not mean that they were comfortable doing so; the vast majority of people not only initially resisted, but continued to resist throughout the experiment. However, when told by the experimenter to continue administering shocks to the learner, most did so. This study has been used to explain obedience to authority, and why otherwise good people would engage in atrocious behaviors.

Milgram devised his experiment to help understand if the drive for obedience was something ingrained in all human beings. What he seemed to understand was that large-scale atrocities simply could not be committed without involvement by multiple people. Of course, for Milgram, studying in the early 1960s, the most recent large-scale atrocity was the Holocaust. As he points out, "It has been reliably established that from 1933-45 millions of innocent persons were systematically slaughtered on command. Gas chambers were built, death camps were guarded, daily quotas of corpses were produced with the same efficiency as the manufacture of appliances. These inhumane policies may have originated in the mind of a single person, but they could only be carried out on a massive scale if a very large number of persons obeyed orders" (Milgram, 1963, p. 371, para.1). Moreover, Milgram seemed to understand that these people were not necessarily all evil people. Instead, observing post-World War II Germany and the aftermath of the Holocaust, it seemed that these people were simply inclined to follow orders, which made Milgram want to see what percentage of people would engage in behavior that they believed would harm another human being simply because an authority figure instructed them to do so.

One of the criticisms of Milgram's experiments is that they were cruel to the study participants, many of whom suffered extreme stress during the experimental phase, and who may have had a difficult time reconciling their behavior in the context of the study with their perceptions of self outside of the study. Diana Baumrind is one of the people who believed that the stress resulting from the experiment was somehow inhumane. However, what she ignores, which Milgram points out, is that the subjects did not behave as the researchers thought they would. As a result, "The extreme tension induced in some subjects was unexpected. Before conducting the experiment, the procedures were discussed with many colleagues, and none anticipated the reactions that subsequently took place" (Milgram, 1964, p. 848, para. 7). Milgram did not expect to see the high level of obedience to authority that he saw, and, therefore, had no reason to believe that the subjects would experience the clearly high levels of stress exhibited during the study.

Zimbardo examined Milgram's obedience studies and came to three conclusions. First, he determined that "obedience to authority requires each of us to first participate in the myth-making process of creating authority figures who then must legitimize their authority through the evidence of our submission and obedience to them" (Zimbardo, 1974, p.566, para.2). In the described studies, there is an authority figure who urges the person to continue, and the figure could have some detrimental impact, albeit a relatively small one, on the actors in the studies. For example, the students who failed to complete the studies would not get credit for participation. Next, Zimbardo believes that, "the reason we can be manipulated so readily is precisely because we maintain an illusion of personal invulnerability and personal control, all the time being insensitive to the power of social forces and "discriminable" stimuli within the situation, which are in fact the potent determinants of action" (Zimbardo, 1974, p.566, para.2). In other words, because people believe that they remain in control and are the ones making their own decisions, they are more easily manipulated than if they are aware of an outside influence on their actions. Finally, Zimbardo believes that "evil deeds are rarely the product of evil people acting from evil motives, but are the product of good bureaucrats simply doing their job" (Zimbardo, 1974, p.566, para.2). The failure to question authority is more of a motivator in negative actions than the desire to harm people and this blind adherence to authority has revealed itself in several different social situations.

The False Consensus Bias

The False Consensus Bias explains the idea that most people believe that most people think and feel the same way that they think and feel about things. In other words, people tend to assume that they are average in their beliefs. Moreover, people tend to assume that those who do disagree with them are flawed in some way. "The false consensus bias, in summary, both reflects and creates distortions in the attribution process. It results from nonrandom sampling and retrieval of evidence and from idiosyncratic interpretation of situational factors and forces. In turn, it biases judgments about deviance and deviates, and helps lead actors and observers to divergent perceptions of behavior, and, more generally, promotes variance and error in the interpretation of social phenomena"(Ross et al., 1977, p.299-300, para.5/1).

Social Identity Theory

Social Identity Theory suggests that group membership and identity is important to people, regardless of the merits of the group. A wide variety of studies have been done where study subjects have been divided into groups on the basis of unimportant characteristics, yet still form group loyalty on the basis of those characteristics. This helps explain some of the underlying behavior behind bias and prejudice. While in a laboratory setting there is no real advantage to favoring one's own group, in real-world applications, favoring one's own group can be very beneficial in the real world. For example, the group most likely to be similar to the individual is that person's family, and favoring the family will bring about positive results for the individual. However, it is important to understand that bias can be very detrimental to society, as a whole, and to outsiders in society, in particular. "People typically seek other people who are similar to themselves, being comfortable with others they perceive as members of their own in-group. From comfort follows, at best, neglect of people from outgroups and, at worst, murderous hostility toward out-groups perceived as threatening the in-group. Biases do vary by degree, and the psychologies of moderate and extreme biases differ considerably" (Fiske, 2002, p.123, para.1).

One of the interesting findings is that bias seems to exist, even in populations who do not want to exhibit bias. However, these biases may be more subtle, which makes them ultimately more difficult to eradicate. Moreover, while these people may not ever engage in intentional or overt discrimination, it is important to realize the negative impact of subtle discrimination. "Automatic reactions to outgroup members matter in everyday behavior. Awkward social interactions, embarrassing slips of the tongue, unchecked assumptions, stereotypic judgments, and spontaneous neglect all exemplify the mundane automaticity of bias, which creates a subtly hostile environment for out-group members" (Fiske, 2002, p. 126, para.2). The good news is that, when motivated to do so, people can account for these automatic reactions, but they have to be aware of the reactions and they have to be motivated to counteract them.

One of Fiske's most interesting findings is that not all out-groups are treated the same way. Some outgroups are respected because of high status, but resented and disliked because they are seen as competition for the in-group (Fiske, 2002, p.125, para. 6). These groups would include Asians, Jews, career women, and other groups that compete with the dominant social norm for resources and jobs. In contrast, "Other out-groups (older people, disabled people, housewives) are pitied and disrespected for their perceived incompetence and low status, but they are nurtured and liked as warm because they do not threaten the in-group" (Fiske, 2002, p. 125, para. 6). Finally, some out groups are both disrespected and disliked, which results in them receiving the worst treatment; these groups include the homeless and the poor (Fiske, 2002, p.125, para. 6).

What is interesting is that the desire to categorize people as in-group or out-group seems almost automatic to human beings. "An important cognitive consequence of this pervasiveness is that the articulation of an individual's social world in terms of its categorization into groups becomes a guide for his conduct in situations to which some criteria of intergroup division can be meaningfully applied" (Tajfel et al., 1971, p.153, para.3). In other words, group divisions can be adaptive, because, even if the theoretical ideal is the treatment of all human beings equally, to do so would likely result in very negative consequences for the individual. The problem is that this desire to categorize continues, even when there is no real impetus or benefit to categorizing people as in group or out of group. Anytime a person is in a group situation, he or she faces the desire to categorize, and even meaningless differences can lead to "differential intergroup behavior" (Tajfel et al., 1971, p.153, para.3).

Furthermore, the drive to categorize people as in-group and out-group seems to be motivated by more than benefits for one group. Instead, it seems also to be linked to self-esteem, with the notion that members of the in-group experience an increase in self-esteem when compared to out-group members. However, this theory has limitations. As the majority group grows, members of the majority may not even identify with that majority status in a meaningful way. In other words, it is much less important to a white person's daily experience that he is white than it is to a black person's daily experience that he is black. "As the security of a majority group increases, the self-esteem of its members becomes less susceptible to the favourability of intergroup comparisons. Other social groups largely become irrelevant" (Abrams & Hogg, 1988, p.324, para. 3).

Bargaining

While there is no single definitive study on bargaining, a number of studies have been conducted to see how people bargain. What these studies have demonstrated is that the presence of a bilateral threat is actually the least conducive to effective bargaining. Both parties do more poorly when there is a bilateral threat present. Being under duress, rather than encouraging cooperation, actually hinders cooperation. In addition, forcing communication between two people, even if they otherwise have the means to communicate, helps foster cooperation.