The assassination of Major General Qassem Soleimani
Introduction

In early 2020, January 3, the U.S. launched airstrike attacks around Baghdad International Airport and killed two of the most influential leaders in Iran, Iraq, and the surrounding regions. The strike killed Qassem Soleimani, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps- Quds Force's Major General, and Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis, the Deputy head of the Popular Mobilization Commission, and also the founder of the militia known as Kata' ib Hezbollah (Jahanbani, 2020). The strikes happened when there was an escalating conflict between the US, Iran and Iraq. This was after December 27, 2019, when a famous proxy from Iran by the name Kata' ib Hezbollah killed several pro-Iranian Militia members and a U.S. citizen four days down the line. The hit triggered criticisms of the Trump administration of how he was using his diplomatic, executive powers and ethical judgment in leadership. He was accused of a poorly planned strategy in Iran (Blazakis, 2020). This paper focuses on three important issues; 1) Whether the executive order by President Trump was an effective use of his executive powers, diplomatic strategy and ethical leadership, 2) Whether the killing of General Soleiman amounted to inhibiting the U.S. interest in the region or promoted it, 3) whether the act constituted what the International Law refers to state-sponsored terrorism.

Soleiman was considered the brainchild and facilitator of the extensive reach of Iran in the region. He, indeed, engineered relationships with a large network of groups in the Middle East and elsewhere (Parker & Noack, 2020). Although the focus on the killing of General Soleiman is justified, it is the significance of the death of Al-Muhandi that seems to have escaped people's attention. He played a central role in mobilization in Iraq, but most significantly, he is the hallmark of what the Iranian state's priorities were in Iraq. The two characters were eliminated with a single strike ordered by the U.S. leadership. The world was left wondering what would become of IRGC-QF in regional politics, especially its links with militia groups in Syria and Iraq.

Analysis of Trump's Order

Executive leadership

The United States Constitution shares power between three branches of federal governance guided by the system of separation of powers. In The Prize Cases (1862), the courts realized that even with no formal announcement by the Congress that there was war, one was already on. Therefore, even though none of the branches of governance had a right to wage war against any of its states, the 1795 and 1807 laws allowed the President to exercise statutory powers to stop an insurrection (Vladeck, 2004).

When the strike on Soleimani was ordered, there was no briefing on the legality of the attack. Nevertheless, the National Security Advisor of the Trump Administration, Robert O' Brien, invoked the 2002 Authorization for the Use of Military Force when the war against Saddam was launched. O'Brien also stated that the move was consistent with the constitutional authorities of the President being the Commander In Chief. He had a responsibility to defend the U.S. and its interests against any attack (Kennedy & Northa, 2020). However, O'Brien did not explain the nature of the threat to the U.S. The attack against General Soleimani was carried out without notifying Congress beforehand.

It is in the public domain that the U president has the legal authority to defend the nation and Americans from aggression. So far, the President can invoke that responsibility to justify the strike against Soleimani. However, on executive leadership, this paper postulates that the order did not meet the threshold. The President failed to notify Congress, which is a legal requirement. Since the strike was done outside of the U.S., there's a compelling argument that it would have been in the interest of the country to forge forward as a united government. Thus, Trump failed in his executive leadership role.

Diplomatic leadership

It seems that the world view of President Trump of International Relations is limited. He is not tactical in decision making. He sacks key military and political figures in an unorthodox fashion and thus undermines his administration's ability to deliver trusted service to the American nation and the world. The political opinion polls among the important U.S. allies such as Australia , Germany, France Jordan, Japan, Mexico, the U.K. and South Korea indicate that they have no confidence in Trump and his administration (Blazakis, 2020). George Bush and his administration branded the Quds Force, an international terrorist organization in the year 2007. After four years, the Obama administration pronounced new sanctions on Soleimani and three senior officials of the Qud's Force because they were linked to a plot to assassinate the Ambassador for Saudi Arabia to the United States (Blaza kis, 2020; Mellish, 2020).

Being predictable and credible is a critical quality in leadership and in international relations. This is something that President Trump does not seem to appreciate. Rhetorical pursuits aren't policy, and won't help. The reputation of Trump is compromised already. The price that has to be paid for coercion, deterrence and reassurance has gone up. The chance that there will be a miscalculation and uncalled for escalation for conflict, given the killing of Major General Qassem Soleimani is much higher now (Mellish, 2020). The random approach to geopolitics by President Trump has led to important enemies of the U.S. such as Russia, Iran, and North Korea to outsmart the USA by readjusting their foreign policies to counter Trump's approaches. Trump's administrative team does not seem to have the not guts to tell him where he veers off the line. They all seem to resonate with every of his whims on important leadership matters touching on the U.S. and the world.

One of the apparent devaluations of the U.S. Diplomatic policy is that it seems to be anchored and driven by cash and ego as opposed to true values. The President's administration failed to notify any of the U.S. allies in Europe regarding the killing of Qassem and Soleimani. It should not be lost...…security. Such a stance has been assumed by international law regarding the responsibility of the states in the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Acts.

Effect of Soleimani's assassination

Soleiman was in charge of the Quds force, and extension of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. He was the campaigned on the ground against ISIS in the Iraq region. He coordinated several militias to defeat the group with cult-like characteristics. While the U is happy to take credit for the defeat of ISIS, it has not admitted that it also heavily relied on the heinous tactics of General Soleiman using his militia groups and his acumen on the war front (Risen, 2020). Qassem was clearly a state agent of Iran. General Soleiman was Iran's most important envoy overseas and was Tehran's political quick fixer in the Middle East. For the first time in history, the U.S. branded a unit of another state, a terrorist group: the Revolutionary Guards and Quds Force (Risen, 2020).

Based on the definition given for terrorist groups earlier, then the assassination of General Soleiman is not a terrorist attack by the U.S. To begin with, the strike order was commissioned by the head of state. Secondly, Qassem Soleimani would not be regarded as an exception or aberrational target in conventional warfare as defined by Colonel James Terry. He was a General that was involved in military operations in the Middle East by militias and a trusted agent of the Iranian state in its military actions across the region. Therefore, the strike was not state-sponsored terrorism on the part of the U.S.

Conclusion

The paper analyzes the killing of General Qassem Soleimani by U.S. forces on January 3, as ordered by President Donald Trump. The analysis has been guided by three concerns: 1) whether the order by the President was an effective exercise of the executive, diplomatic and ethical leadership, 2) whether the assassination hindered or enhanced U.S. interests in the Middle East, 3) whether the strike was an example of state-sponsored terrorism as defined by the International Law. The deductions have thus revealed here that the order by the President was not an effective exercise of executive, diplomatic or ethical leadership. He did not use the executive machinery at his disposal. The order, therefore, did not measure up to the ethical standards of leadership expected of the President of the United States. There effect of the strike was not conclusively clear. Although the short term effects can be seen, it is not clear what the long term effects will be, so far. In fact, pundits argue that the strike will not have a notable long term effect on U.S. interests in the Middle East. Finally, it has been demonstrated that the strike and assassination of General Qassem Soleimani do not qualify as an act of state-sponsored terrorism. The order to strike was issued by the President, who is in office constitutionally. Secondly, General Qassem Soleimani would not pass for an aberrational or exceptional target in…