An Analysis of The Joint Integrated Contingency Model (JICM)

Introduction and Background

The discipline of operations research developed as an outgrowth of the development of science and technology in the 20th Century early years. After the First World War, researchers envisioned the best way to defeat or implement airplanes, large armed warships, and submarines. In late 1941, operational research as a discipline had developed in the major military commands, first in Britain and eventually in other organizations in the US army, air, and naval corporations. For instance, in 1945, its development allowed Air Corporation to drop about 13000 mines to damage or sink approximately 1075 warships. The main advantage of operations research is that it lowered the loss of surface ships and improved the sinking of blockade-runner submarines. After the Second World War, various leaders have recognized the value in analysis exceeding the operational level. As a result, the discipline has increasingly developed to include a varied array of decisions. One of the critical things that have developed due to the expansion of operations research as a discipline is the Joint Integrated Contingency Model (JICM). Thus, this paper seeks to create a detailed analysis of the JICM analytic model by looking at its capabilities, limitations, advantages, and disadvantages, evaluating its operations, and finally, an analysis.

Purpose and Use/Capabilities and Limitations of the JICM Model

The Joint Integrated Contingency Model (JICM) is a large modeling and simulation tool that the RAND Corporation created. Its development was sponsored by the US Office of the Secretary for Defense (OSD).[footnoteRef:1] It was created for a campaign analysis at the operational and strategic levels of air, land, and maritime warfare. The main emphasis was placed on the operations at the theatre levels. This analysis tool was first created during the 1980s bearing in mind the large-scale combats in the Korean peninsula and the European theatre. As this model developed into maturity, the nature and scale of the military threat changed towards the end of the Cold War. Mainly, the JICM analysis tool has been utilized to study large-scale wars, including confrontations between India and Pakistan and between Koreans. The model has also been used increasingly in the United States as an analysis tool for small-scale military conflicts, such as various studies on inter-regional disputes in Eastern Europe and regional conflicts between Taiwan and China along the Taiwan Strait1. RAND Corporation received the approval to provide the DSTO with the JICM in 1999, followed by the training of the DSTO and updating JICM to meet various requirements in 2000. Additionally, this analytic tool was designed to operate on the operational platform of Solaris mainly, also called the Sun UNIX, and can be easily supported by various analysts. [1: Bennett, Bruce W., Arthur M. Bullock, Daniel B. Fox, Carl M. Jones, and John Schrader.JICM 1.0 Summary. RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA, 1994.]

The Joint Integrated Contingency Model (JICM) was developed to work on the operational levels of the Solaris platform. However, various efforts are currently being made to transform its operation from Solaris to PC-based Linux. The simulation of this model can be run or operated wholly in the form of closed loops, and the capability of its execution is considered to be very fast, at an approximated rate of one day per minute. The JICM model can also be run or operated interactively with the analysts who assess the campaigns development over four hours, which is considered the simulation time for the model.[footnoteRef:2] For instance, the campaign analyst can perform various tasks, including changing troop deployments, choosing different loads of weapons for bombers, changing tactics, and even activating contingency plans. [2: Bennett, Bruce W., Arthur M. Bullock, Daniel B. Fox, Carl M. Jones, and John Schrader.JICM 1.0 Summary. RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA, 1994.]

Additionally, this analytic model was developed to evaluate various case studies mainly by using various parameters in a concept of a single scenario for comparative analysis. Within this model, every aspect of the joint military campaign is handled in a self-consistent and integral manner1. Therefore, the most significant element in establishing a new campaign on the JICM model and developing scripts for the operational or war plans has to be carried out consistently with the operations concept. Also, it should be checked in detail before that scenario is considered or used for analysis.

The functional components of the JICM model are made up of three main parts. The first is the command and government agents, which record the national operations and future military plans. Every government can use generic procedures to mobilize, alert, and train forces or employ rules meant for the federal troops, specifically if selective or partial mobilizations are necessary.[footnoteRef:3] Governments can also establish their preferred procedures used to employ nuclear forces within the control of the government. The command agent also reflects military commands that operate forces owned by one nation or a coalition that drives within a specified regional contingency. Most often, military operations are planned and executed by JICM commands. Another component of the functional aspect of the JICM is the campaign. The models of military operations, including deployments and combat adjudication, were initially referred to as the campaign model or the forcing agent. The JICM also encompasses mobility and logistics models and nuclear force operations such as strategic command and damage assessment, a style ='color:#000;text-decoration: underline!important;' id='custom' target='_blank' href='https://www.paperdue.com/topic/intelligence-essays'>intelligence, communications, and control. It also contains models of naval warfare. The latest model of the JICM is made up of the Integrated Theater Model (ITM), which has been advanced to include baseline values for every JICM parameter and the orders of battle for about seventy significant countries across the world. The last component is the system software which entails a wide range of software systems used to support the JICM model1. [3: Bennett, Bruce W., Arthur M. Bullock, Daniel B. Fox, Carl M. Jones, and John Schrader.JICM 1.0 Summary. RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA, 1994.]

In addition to the capabilities and the uses described above, the JICM can perform numerous other activities as discussed. The latest model has added a new parameter, which allows the JICM user or analysts to define a distinct vulnerability for armaments in forwarding shelters around a border. Also, a battle allocator has been added in the advanced model to improve the posturing decisions of the LOC Commander. Since the ITM component of the JICM follows such units as corps and divisions, finding a division with several contracts at a given time is not uncommon.[footnoteRef:4] The battle allocator is used to examine the contracts of such forces. It is also used in determining the distribution of combat power of the force among the various battles. Another essential function of the JICM is the consumption of the ground force supply, which is mainly tracked in terms of the ED-days of supply of ammunition except for the highly explicit ammunitions used by long-range arms. Also, more sophisticated consumption factors have been included in the ITM since there are new battle types1. It also allows for the development of integrated networks and land geography. This means that places are now well defined and linked to form the basis or foundation for combat and administrative movements. [4: Bennett, Bruce W., Arthur M. Bullock, Daniel B. Fox, Carl M. Jones, and John Schrader.JICM 1.0 Summary. RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA, 1994.]

Furthermore, the model provides for a complete operational maneuver across the land network. This is specifically made possible through the ITM in the advanced version of the JICM, which allows for movement towards any direction across any part of the land network. It also defines the interaction of combats every time they come into contact with the opposing forces in any configuration, including internal security contacts, rear contacts, flank contacts, and frontal contacts. The commands of the JICM often reflect corps in the real world. They are the most significant components to maneuver over the network even though the individual forces outside their view can also be involved. The model further enhances definitions of battles, including factors such as the various aspects of the Situational Force Scoring (SFS) methodology, which widely entails components such as casualty distribution, shortages of forces, terrain, and posture1.

The most significant disadvantage associated with this model is that it is, at best, a tool used for exploratory analysis and not a war game. As such, its application is limited and cannot be used to predict the certainty of a particular battle favoring a specific side.[footnoteRef:5] Instead, this analytic tool is best described as a sophisticated tool or calculator used to help professional analysts in this field appropriately evaluate how they perceive a campaign. Another limitation of the JICM model is that it has significantly less access and control over the naval models and, subsequently, their functions. This arises because the naval operations are not necessarily a generic product of the JICM model. Instead, it is a model of the US Navy contained in the JICM model2. [5: Lawrence, Christopher A. Comparing the RAND Version of the 3:1 Rule to Real-World Data. The INTERNATIONAL TNDM NEWSLETTER, 2018. ]

The Pros and Cons of the JICM Simulation Model

The JICM sparks the interest of the wargaming and analytic communities. It offers models used for decision making to help in analysis, wargaming, and in some instances, takes the role of certain players. It also provides models of military combat and operations. Compared to the traditional military operations models that emphasized predicting combat results with a given degree of precision, the JICM is a more reliable model. It provides a more detailed or laboratory study of military operations and strategy. This allows for a detailed evaluation and analysis of the alternative operations and design regarding how strong combat outcomes are across a given range of uncertainty in rules of war, performance factors, and scenarios. This tool has been primarily designed for analytic functions and used for wargaming and training, among other requirements and needs2. Another main advantage associated...

…breakthrough. This is also important in other rules of combat resolution. Finally, the ITM component allows the JICM user to establish a script for various events, including specific forces damage and underground mobilization and training3. The different options will enable the campaign analysts of the user to provide an accurate account of issues potentially missed by the models and test how sensitive the outcomes of various events could be. [14: Wilson, Barry A., and Daniel B. Fox.Ground Combat in the JICM. RAND NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INST SANTA MONICA CA, 1995.]

Analysis of the JICM

An analysis was conducted to compare the RAND version of the 3:1 ratio to the real-world data.[footnoteRef:15] Two databases were considered, the BaDB covering 243 battles between 1600 and 1900, and the second was DLEDB covering 675 division-level engagements between 1904 and 1991. The first provides a historical context for the 3:1 thumb rule, while the second examines how the rule is applicable in modern combat. This was tested to the RAND version 3:1 and used in the JICM with SFS and other models. The 3:1 rule states that the defender and attacker both incur equal loss rates at a force ration of 3:1 if the battle is in diverse topography and the defender has the upper hand in prepared defenses. Thus, the engagements from the two databases were selected, ranging from force ratios of 2.5 to 1 to 3.5 to 1. These were then mapped to a chart, which looked at losses of attackers versus losses of defenders. In the cases before 1904, despite the extensive database, there are only 12 cases of combat within the stated range which is not statistically significant. This is because the data all in the ranges of 0.50 to 1 and 2.0 to 1.[footnoteRef:16] Thus, 88 percent of the battles are between 0.40 to 1 to 2.50 to 1. If the rule stated above were valid, it would be expected that the percent-per-day ratio of loss would be around 1.00. However, with 9 out of the 12 points below 1.00, only 3 cases (about 25%) have an exchange rate supporting the rule. [15: Lawrence, Christopher A. Comparing the RAND Version of the 3:1 Rule to Real-World Data. The INTERNATIONAL TNDM NEWSLETTER, 2018. ] [16: Bennett, Bruce W., Arthur M. Bullock, Daniel B. Fox, Carl M. Jones, and John Schrader.JICM 1.0 Summary. RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA, 1994.]

To establish a comparison, an examination of the 634 cases between 1904 and 1991 was conducted. After a tabulated analysis, it was established that 98 engagements out of the 634 fall within the ratios of 2.50 to 1 and 3.50 to 1. This represents about 15 percent of the total engagements. Compared to the data from the bad, this is a relatively significant representation of the general population.[footnoteRef:17] However, there is still no indication of the 3:1 ratio rule of thumb. Of the 98, only 19 exhibits the percent-per-day loss ratio between 0.50 to 1.00 and 2.00 to 1.00. Thus, only 19 percent of the cases roughly fall under the 3:1 Force ratio postulated by RAND. Thus, 72 percent of the total cases are below the 0.50 to 1.00 ratio, and only 8 percent are above this ratio. Therefore, the data is not clustered around the mentioned ratio; instead, it is clamped below the 0/50 to 1.00 ratio. However, a better fit is obtained when a straight exchange ratio is used, with 31 percent of the cases falling between 0.50 and 1.00. Thus, this fit is about a third of the attackers losses which still fails to represent the norm. The percentage loss per day is between 0.0 and 5.71, which indicates that the data is concentrated at the lower figures; hence the higher values are considered outliers. Thus, there isnt any clear correlation. Instead, the effect recorded is the opposite, showing that the relationship present is negative. Hence, the RAND construct is not adequately supported2. [17: ]

This construct also appears in the Soviet literature, which shows that this may be where it was drawn. Thus, the original scenarios fun for the RSAC war game must be considered. It appears that the 3:1 ratio rule of thumb is used to reflect the experiences of attackers. The data provided shows a relatively straightforward performance between the German Army and the Soviet Army during the Second World War, which falls roughly in the 3:1 ratio.[footnoteRef:18] Therefore, the table is not a correct application in the modern US forces since it might have been generated by the soviet writers based on the equal percentage exchange of losses adhering to the 3:1 ratio rule2. Thus, the SFS should is not adequately trained to represent anything more than a Soviet-doctrine attack. It is not applicable for the US counterattacks or any other force of relatively comparable ability. It should also not be used against any force of inadequate training, cohesiveness, or motivation. If used, such tabulated data should be expected to generate the…