The Political Nature of the Federal Budget Process
Introduction
The federal budget process is overseen by US Congressmen, who are fundamentally immersed in the political nature of government. As Elwood (2008) notes, members of Congress are influenced in three ways: 1) by money that is used to finance their political campaigns; 2) by obtaining the votes necessary for reelection; and 3) by obtaining expert advice on topics that are of personal importance to them. The federal budget process is particularly impactful on the first two and vice versa. For example, “the ability to funnel money into a congressional district or state provides an excellent opportunity for a legislator to remain in office” (Elwood, 2008, p. 3). This ability creates a conflict of interest among the politicians overseeing the budget process. On the one hand they are tasked with producing a budget resolution and allocating funds based on the duty to serve the collective good; on the other hand they have a vested self-interest in ensuring that funds are diverted in ways that will benefit them, their political career and their political cronies. This paper will discuss the political nature of the federal budget process.
Politics and Agency Theory
The political nature of the federal budget process is tied to the political nature of government in general. The budget itself is a representation of how government expenditure is allocated to various sectors, programs, agencies and departments. It reflects the extent to which society deems certain programs and departments as important. However, as Elwood (2008) points out, where money is a factor, corruption is sure to be found. The problem with the federal budget process is that it is overseen by individuals who suffer from the agent-principle paradox.
Agency theory posits that “an agency relationship arises whenever one or more individuals, called principals, hire one or more other individuals, called agents, to perform some service and then delegate decision-making authority to the agents” (ProActive Solutions, 2020). In terms of representative government, the representatives of the people are the members of Congress—they are the agents of the principles, i.e., the voters who put them in positions of power. The voters put the agents (the representatives) in office under the belief that the representatives will do what is in the best interest of stakeholders—the public. However, there are powerful lobbies in Washington, and they spend billions of dollars every year in order to gain influence among these same members of Congress. They promise donations to the campaigns of Congressmen, thus ensuring that the Congress member will have a long and profitable career in politics so long as they do the bidding of these lobbies. A conflict of interest thus arises: the lobbies represent only a small percentage of the public whereas many other voters voted under the impression that the agent would act on behalf of the principle.
One proposition put forward by Eisenhardt (1989) is that “when the principal has information to verify agent behavior, the agent is more likely to behave in the interests of the principal” (p. 60). Eisenhardt (1989) points out that the principal-agent relationship is built upon trust and that there is no way the relationship can work without implicit trust supporting it. However, there have to be precautions and risk reduction strategies in place so that one is not being naïve with respect to the fact that bias and self-interest can and do play a part in that relationship to some degree.
Still, without some system in place in the real world, there is no guarantee that self-interest and conflicts of interest do not arise. That is why in industries like real estate there are penalties that agents face if they are caught abusing the agent-principle relationship. In government, there is less of a system in place for voters to use to ensure that agents are acting in the best interests of the public. They essentially have only the means of the election booth and that opportunity comes once only every few years. In short, there is little accountability in the political nature of the federal budget process because the agency owed to voters is not well-regulated in government. Representatives have far more leeway to act on their behalf or on the behalf of special interest groups than in other organizations.
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