To prevent Iran from regenerating its maritime exclusion defenses, U.S. air forces would need to continue attacks against known mine storage and distribution sites, and destroy or suppress small craft, helicopters, submarines, and enemy "commercial" vessels capable of dispensing mines.
Phase V -- Enable Civil Authority
Completing mine clearing operations would likely be a key task for Littoral Combat Ships equipped with MCM modules, UUVs [Unmanned underwater vehicles], rotary wing aircraft, and supporting sensors.
To prevent Iran from regenerating its maritime exclusion defenses, U.S. air forces would need to continue attacks against known mine storage and distribution sites, and destroy or suppress small craft, helicopters, submarines, and enemy "commercial" vessels capable of dispensing mines.
COA 2
This course of analysis this seeks to provide a foundation for clear thinking about the potential use of force against Iran in protecting Azerbaijan.
JTF-50 COA Presentation Format
DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL
Reading C340.3
23
ASSUMPTIONS
Assumptions operated in COA process:
The behavior of the Iranian regime postures as grave a set of challenges to the global community as any problem being faced currently. Iran's nuclear determinations against Azerbaijan; its support for terrorism;
The width of the infantry battalion subdivision be contingent on and its efforts to undermine hopes for stability in Iran, including lethal backing for groups attacking Azerbaijan troops, are all deeply troubling the nation
JTF-50 COA Presentation Format
DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL
Reading C340.3
24
Operational CoGs
Friendly Forces
Friendly Intel action
Threat reaction to friendly actions
Friendly counteraction to threat reaction
Critical Capabilities
Force Projection-Deploy, Sustain, Lethality, Maneuver
Mission Command.
To occupy a support-by-fire position to support an attack
Critical Requirements
Access to APOD/SPOD
LOCs
Host Nation Support
CAISR
Mobility
Missile Defense
Air Superiority
Critical Vulnerabilities
LOCs
C4ISR
Air Platforms
To attack enemy-held positions from an unexpected direction
Enhance international legitimacy
Gain multinational cooperation
Develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations
Operational Center of Gravity-Friendly
JTF-50 COA Presentation Format
DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL
Reading C340.3
25
Operational CoG
Preserve sureness in ultimate victory or success
Resources/Means to receive Intelligence
Alliance forces
Small naval fleet from allies
Critical Capabilities
State security forces
Unconventional forces,
Terrorists
Sea power
Airpower
Operate with allies
Critical Requirements
Good weather chemical gear fuel and ammo re-supply precise intelligence
Critical Vulnerabilities
IF Allies break ENIGMA code system
IF new merchant ships have faster speeds
IF Allies develop more effective radar capabilities
Strategic Center of Gravity Analysis-Enemy
Depicted the CoG analysis generated during mission analysis and update throughout COA development.
JTF-50 COA Presentation Format
DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL
Reading C340.3
26
Operational CoG
Clan support or sharing of power
Ambushes and raids.
Insurgents
Underground militia
Critical Capabilities
Acts of terror against population, infrastructure and security services
Demonstrations and propaganda events and printed media
Guerilla attacks against conventional forces in rural areas
Critical Requirements
Command and Control Structure
Finances
Liaisons
Leadership
Training
IO
fight more effectively at night move faster operationally to intercept reported convoy
Critical Vulnerabilities
Liaisons-SAPA representation to clan
IF they employ counter FW 200 operations
IF they change code settings frequently or adopt an unbreakable code system
IF new merchant ships have faster speeds
IF they come up with more effective radar
Capabilities
Electronic and technological advances may out pace Iranian developments.
Operational Center of Gravity Analysis-Enemy
JTF-50 COA Presentation Format
DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL
Reading C340.3
27
Operational CoG
Maintain confidence in ultimate victory or success
Resources/Means to receive Intelligence
Coalition forces
Critical Capabilities
Worldwide Linkages
State harboring radical Islamic fundamentalism
Rise of networks means that power is migrating to non-state actors
Critical Requirements
Intelligence regarding production facilities in Iran
Effective and sustained bombing of production facilities
Critical Vulnerabilities
Communication Links
Globalization
Increased autonomy of network
Financial Basis
Strategic Center of Gravity Analysis-Enemy
Depicted the CoG analysis generated during mission analysis and update throughout COA development.
JTF-50 COA Presentation Format
DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL
Reading C340.3
28
CoG
Ideology
freedom of movement, insurgent safe havens clandestine agents the civilian population,
Critical Capabilities
Fundamentalist Sheik
Belief in Cause
Shared Intelligence
Premeditated, politically motivated violence
Critical Requirements
Resources/Means to receive Intelligence
Time
Critical Vulnerabilities
Lack of credible HUMINT
Technological competence
Maintaining Focus
INSURGENTS
Depicted the CoG analysis generated during mission analysis and update throughout COA development.
JTF-50 COA Presentation Format
DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL
Reading C340.3
29
JOA
Continuous operations including normal and routine military activity "performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies."
Goals include shaping perceptions, developing capacity for coalition operations, improving information and intelligence exchange, and providing peacetime and contingency access.
Also important that shaping activities could be "executed in one theater in order to create effects and/or achieve objectives in another."
Logical Lines of Operations
International borders reestablished in the region.
Red military defeated.
Red offensive capability neutralized.
Red regime removed and replaced with government favorable to coalition interests.
Occupation and stabilization duties transitioned to non-U.S. force within 12 months.
Gain air & maritime superiority.
Support DOS and OGA.
Conduct stability operations.
Support Yellow leadership.
Mass combat power and sustainment.
Strategic end state
Retrograde coalition forces.
Attack strategic-level targets.
Security/Information Military
Governance
Economic
Diplomacy
Security
Information
Maintain sovereign state.
Secure Yellow borders.
Control population centers.
Isolate leadership
Establish legitimate coalition.
1 -- Cdr's decision for amphibious operations . PIR- Red offensive culmination imminent.
2 LCC offensive launched. LCC force build up complete.
FFIR- LCC RSOI.
FFIR- amphibious operations success.
3 Transition to stability. Red forces defeated.
IRB restored, DMZ established. FFIR- Yellow infrastructure capacity.
4 Transition to phase 5. Yellow forces capable of managing internal and external affairs. FFIR- Yellow force capability.
PIR- Yellow insurgent activity.
5 Regime change. Actions of Red towards Yellow and JTF. PIR- Red government collapse I & W.
5
Branch
Regime change
Legend
Psychological
operations
SPOD security
Maritime superiority
Maritime security
Amphib assault
Maritime security
Spt LCC
Maritime superiority
Spt ACC
Defeat Red Off. navy
Handover/
scale down
Maritime security
Train Yellow navy
COA 1
JTF-50 COA Presentation Format
DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL
Reading C340.3
32
JTF
JFACC
JFLCC
JFSOCC
JFMCC
Yellow MOD
Coordination
TACON
OPCON
COCOM
XX
ESG
CSG
SAG
MPS
PATRON
SAG
Amphib
X
SF
NSWTG
PSYOPS
JSOAC
AETF
AEF
ASOG
Yellow
Patrol
Boats
COA 1
Task Force
Command Level
Major Subordinate Element
(MSE) Level
MSE Subordinate
Units Level
Depict Command Relationships
X
XX
Yellow
JTF-50 COA Presentation Format
DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL
Reading C340.3
33
Phase I-- Deter
Deterring undesirable adversary action and demonstrating joint force capabilities and resolve. This phase specifically includes preparatory actions for subsequent phases of the campaign, such as mobilization, staging intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, developing logistics and force protection plans and assisting other government agencies and non-
governmental organizations. In this phase, military action is focused on "crisis defined.
Deterring undesirable adversary action and demonstrating joint force capabilities and resolve. This phase specifically includes preparatory actions for subsequent phases of the campaign, such as mobilization, staging intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, developing logistics and force protection plans and assisting other government agencies and non-governmental organizations. In this phase, military action is focused on "crisis defined.
Phase II -- Seizure Initiative
A force of special operations forces and possibly Army airborne and air assault units, could seize and hold a lodgment at a time and location of Central Command's choosing Immediately after landing.
SOF, Marine Corps, and Army forces would concentrate their efforts on expanding their operating perimeter and preventing the enemy from closing within range to use G-RAMM [Guided-rockets, artillery, mortars, missiles] weapons.
Forces will secure lodgment as a jumping off point for follow-on assaults up the coastline of Iran to clear areas that could be used by the enemy to launch attacks against vessels in the Gulf of Oman and Strait of Hormuz, including vulnerable U.S. MCM [Mine countermeasures] forces.
35
Phase III-Dominate
In addition to making lodgments on the Iranian coast, islands just inside the Gulf -- including Abu-Musa, Sirri, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb -- will need to be besieged by accuracy strikes and occupied by U.S. expeditionary forces as required.
They will continue to perform the same functions as the previous have. However, DOD military force will be used more aggressively to isolate the enemy force from outside support. OGAs and IOs will continue to influence allies or neighboring states in support of operational objectives.
S/CRS will then start preparing for the transition to stability and reconstruction operations during this phase. Unity of effort is critical to forcing rapid culmination of major combat operations
Phase 5 -- Enable Civil Authority
Short-term lasting from 2 weeks to 6 months.
Making sure the populations live in a fair economy close operations might aim to Make sure that enemy force is destroyed, then seize a piece of terrain, disrupt an insurgent cell, or secure a local population.
Make sure that proper security is set in place.
Making sure that there are no more guerilla forces.
Phase IV -- Stabilize
The operational risk in Iran will be reduced for the reason that there is a high degree of commonality between organizations in their emphasis of effort. S/CRS has responsibility to lead and coordinate all government agencies in this phase. DOD, USAID, UNDP, WB, and IMF have the capacity to provide foreign aid during the stability period.
It will be critical that aid money for Iran will clearly have to support long-term economic development goals
COMPARISON & DECISION MATRIX
WEIGHTING FACTORS
Evaluation
Comparison
Good Fair Poor
5 3 1
Weight Evaluation Criteria
39
The Commander has now assigned weighting factors to his criteria. Unlike our previous comparison where all criteria were treated equally, the Commander has now stated that certain criteria are more important to him. Note how the application of weighting has now changed the results. Even though we are using the same criteria for our comparison, the use of weighting illustrates how they factor into our comparison results.
Talk to the slide...
It isn't difficult to see that weighting has changed the results of our comparison: now COA 3 is the winner.
Criteria must be tailored to the COAs and situation.
Be able to justify why the criteria…
