BP Oil Disaster Impact and Lessons Learned
On April 20, 2010, the BP Deepwater Horizon spill dumped more than 4.1 million barrels of crude into the Gulf region over 87 days (Walsh et al., On the Edge). The oil and gas industry developed new technologies in pursuit of valuable energy supplies, venturing into deeper waters farther from the coastline (National Commission, 85). Regulators, however, failed to keep up with the industrial expansion and new technology -- often because of industry's resistance to more effective oversight (Juhas 11). This led to a major shortfall in the supervision of offshore drilling. Companies cited for negligence included well owner BP, Switzerland-based rig owner Transocean and cement contractor Halliburton. A major blowout -- a high-pressure ball of gas, mud and oil that shot up from the oil reservoir -- killed eleven crewmembers and seriously injured several others (Klein 12). In the end, fire engulfed and destroyed the oil rig. The media sent the world daily images of the uncontrolled spill. It has been classified by environmental groups, politicians, everyday citizens and civic leaders as a major failure in corporate governance and social responsibility (National Commission 89).
Probable causes for the horrific accident are many. The companies involved were immediately criticized for failing to operate in a "safe and workmanlike manner" and failing to take necessary precautions to keep the well "under control at all times" (Schooner 13). It is believe that BP's management process did not adequately identify or address risks created by late changes to well design and procedures or ensure that cement was adequately tested (National Commission 90). There is also evidence that BP, Transocean, and Halliburton failed to communicate effectively amongst themselves regarding lessons learned from an earlier near-miss disaster to crew members. As cited in the 2011 National Commission Report to the President:
"The well blew out because a number of separate risk factors, oversights, and outright mistakes combined to overwhelm the safeguards meant to prevent just such an event from happening. But most of the mistakes and oversights at Macondo can be traced back to a single overarching failure -- a failure of management. Better management by BP, Halliburton, and Transocean would almost certainly have prevented the blowout by improving the ability of individuals involved to identify the risks they faced, and to properly evaluate, communicate, and address them. A blowout in deepwater was not a statistical inevitability." (90)
There are also speculations that certain time and money-saving decisions resulted in increased safety risks that personnel had not fully considered. One cost cutting decision was to install a continuous set of threaded casing pipes from the wellhead down to the bottom of its well (Smith 28). This can be problematic in deep, high-pressure wells because it seals off the space between the casing and the bore hole, leaving workers blind to leaks that can sneak up around the casing pipe (as the BP Deepwater blowout is suspected to have done). In addition, the long string gives gas more time to percolate into the well (Klein, 13). A preferred alternative in high-pressure deepwater is a "liner" design in which drillers install and then cement in place a short string of casing in the lower reaches of the well before casing the rest of the well (National Commission 93). This design enables the driller to watch for leaks while the cement is setting. It takes a more time and is more expensive, but it is considered a much safer method.
The BP Deepwater Horizon spill is considered unique from other oil catastrophes because of its magnitude, duration, emission source and unprecedented use of dispersants and controlled burns (Schooner 15). It devastated the $3 billion fishing industry in the Gulf, which provides one-third of all seafood consumed in the U.S. (Smith 26). There have also been massive impacts to neighboring communities, businesses, and wildlife. Local residents experienced breathing difficulties, headaches, burning eyes and throats, vomiting, abdominal pains, chest pains, skin sensitization, and cardiovascular issues (National Commission 95). Children, the poor, and the elderly continue to appear to be disproportionately affected by such medical issues since the spill (Juhas 13). Complaints of ailments two years later range from persistent fatigue to headaches and chronic coughs. Experts have expressed concern over the human exposure to the crude oil, vapors, contaminated seafood and the chemical dispersants used to break the oil apart (National Commission, 91). BP and the U.S. government used a number of mitigation techniques to stop the spread of the spill -- corexit, controlled...
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