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Foreign Policy, as an extension of this dramatic arms buildup, in Great Britain and Germany, shows that it was clear in the minds of the governments, war was not only inevitable, it was probably necessary for several economic and political reasons. Both Britain and Germany were vying for the premier spot as the dominant European power in both European and colonial affairs. Britain had a head start and more colonies than Germany, something very irksome to the Kaiser. Germany saw Britain's allies in the East (Russia) as being weak and unable to modernize, and believed that France would not risk her homeland on a localized Balkan or Southern European War ("The Deadly Alliances.")

Germany was still reeling from the policy of placing Germany "in the sun" from Otto Von Bismarck -- and, despite the relationships of the royal lineage's of the time, both countries knew that their economic independence and ability to continue the growth they had seen since the turn of the century depended on their abilities to master colonial exports, control the major trade routes to and from Europe, and establish their own hegemony (Wilhelm II, 2009). This is not to say that either Britain or Germany wanted the type of war that occurred, no one had any idea of the length, intensity, and destruction of this war, the argument is that so much spending on armaments left the powers at a vulnerable position and one that a war of words would eventually turn towards a war of guns.

Germany was developing into an aggressive, highly industrialized country that was running out of options